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THE INVENTION OF HEALTH LAW
The Invention of Health Law
M. Gregg Bloche
By default, the courts are inventing health law. The law governing the
American health system arises from an unruly mix of statutes, regulations,
and judge-crafted doctrines conceived, in the main, without medical care
in mind. Courts are ill-equipped to put order to this chaos, and until re-
cently they have been disinclined to try. But political gridlock and popular
ire over managed care have pushed them into the breach, and the Supreme
Court has become a proactive health policy player. How might judges
make sense of health law's disparate doctrinal strands? Scholars from di-
verse ideological starting points have converged toward a single answer:
the law should look to deploy medical resources in a systematically ra-
tional manner, so as to maximize the benefits that every dollar buys. This
answer bases the orderly development of health care law upon our ability
to reach stable understandings, in myriad circumstances, of what welfare
maximization requires. In this Article, I contend that this goal is not
achievable. Scientific ignorance, cognitive limitations, and normative dis-
agreements yield shifting, incomplete, and contradictory understandings of
social welfare in the health sphere. The chaotic state of health care law
today reflects this unruliness. In making systemic welfare maximization the
lodestar for health law, we risk falling so far short of aspirations for rea-
soned decision making as to invite disillusion about the possibilities for
any sort of rationality in this field. Accordingly, I urge that we define
health law's aims more modestly, based on acknowledgment that its ra-
tionality is discontinuous across substantive contexts and changeable with
time. This concession to human limits, I argue, opens the way to health
policy that mediates wisely between our desire for public action to maxi-
mize the well being of the many and our intimate wishes to be treated non-
instrumentally, as separate ends. I conclude with an effort to identify the
goals that health law, so constructed, should pursue and to suggest how a
strategy of accommodation among these goals might apply to a variety of
legal controversies.
INTRODUCTION
By default, the courts are inventing health law. The law governing
American health care arises from an unruly mix of state and federal
2003]
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agencies and from a jumble of statutes and common-law doctrines' con-
ceived, in the main without medical care in mind. Congressional attempts
to create a comprehensive regulatory scheme to govern the managed care
revolution have fallen victim to political gridlock and interest-group
2power. Political paralysis and the proliferation of legal conflict over the
rights and responsibilities of patients, managed health plans, and medical-
care providers have pushed judges front and center in the health-policy
arena. Yet the courts are ill equipped to put order to the health-policy
chaos. And, aware of their institutional limitations, they have until recently
been disinclined to try. With no comprehensive health policy to guide
them, judges tended to pursue doctrinal integrity within disparate areas of
law. In so doing, they not only sacrificed the goal of systemwide rationality
in the health sphere; they added to the national health-policy disarray.
In the late 1990s, this began to change. Under pressure from a grow-
ing caseload spawned by conflict over managed care, courts construed
statutes and common-law precepts more creatively to fill health-policy
gaps. The most important developments involved ERISA, the 1974 federal
law that, by accident, has become the virtual constitution for the health care
marketplace.' Its drafters paid little heed to its implications for medical
care. Their aim was a national regulatory scheme for employee fringe
I. State laws regulating the health sector include common-law tort, contract, and trust rules;
separate statutory schemes governing licensing, tax exemption, and insurance; and statutes and
regulations implementing Medicaid and other collaborative state and federal health programs. Courts,
licensing boards, attorneys general, insurance commissions, and other administrative agencies interpret
and enforce these laws in disconnected fashion. Federal sources of health care law include the statutes
(and an enormous body of regulations) governing Medicare and Medicaid, which together pay for close
to half of all health services; statutes, regulations, and other guidelines governing federal income-tax
exemption; the Employee Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA"), which governs employees'
fringe benefits (and therefore sets ground rules for most privately purchased medical coverage); and the
statutory and regulatory schemes governing approval and marketing of drugs and medical devices.
Federal judges, the Treasury Department, the Department of Labor (which has jurisdiction over
ERISA), and multiple agencies within the Department of Health and Human Services construe and
apply these sources of law in similarly disconnected fashion. See Clark C. Havighurst, American
Health Care and the Law, in THE PRIVATIZATION OF HEALTH CARE REFORM: LEGAL AND
REGULATORY PERSPECTIVES (M. Gregg Bloche ed., 2003) (criticizing the lack of common principles in
health law and promoting market competition as a unifying paradigm).
2. The collapse of President Clinton's health care reform plan in 1994 is the most dramatic
recent example. See generally HAYNES JOHNSON & DAVID S. BRODER, THE SYSTEM: THE AMERICAN
WAY OF POLITICS AT THE BREAKING POINT (1997) (chronicling the role of interest groups in the failure
of the Clinton administration's health reform efforts). The repeated failure of so-called Patients' Bill of
Rights legislation since the late 1990s is also illustrative. Such legislation would establish an
overarching system of rules for federal and state legal governance of managed health plans and the
market for medical insurance coverage.
3. ERISA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1994 & Supp. Ill 1997), governs all health-insurance
coverage offered by employers. Since the vast majority of Americans with private medical coverage
obtain it through their (or family members') employment, ERISA functions as the main statutory
framework for the health-insurance marketplace.
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benefits.4 To this end, they immunized fringe-benefit plans against state
law.5 Through the mid-1990s, courts conferred this immunity on managed
health care.6 In so doing, they held to formal consistency at an embarrass-
ing price-the inability of most Americans to sue their health plans for
mishandling care.7 By the late 1990s, managed care impunity had become
the stuff of political stump speeches and popular ire. Judges looked for
ways to cut it back.8 With the U.S
. 
Supreme Court's encouragement, courts
have remade medical tort law over the past several years, putting trouble-
some cost-control methods squarely in the sights of state tort lawyers. 9
4. The Congress that enacted the statute in 1974 focused on nationally uniform disclosure and
financial and fiduciary standards as a way both to make it easier for employers to offer fringe benefits
(especially pension plans) and to protect pension funds from corrupt and inept management. See U.S.
SENATE SUBCOMM. ON LABOR OF THE COMM. ON LABOR & PUBLIC WELFARE, 94TH CONG., 2D SESS.,
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT OF 1974; see also Shaw
v. Delta Air Lines, 463 U.S. 85, 105 n.25 (1983).
5. ERISA section 514(a) calls for preemption of any state laws that "relate to" an employee
benefit plan. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1994 & Supp. I 1997). This so-called conflict preemption must be
pleaded as a defense. ERISA section 502(a) confers upon plan beneficiaries a federal cause of action
"to recover benefits due" under a plan. Id. § 1132(a)(1)(B). This provision results in so-called complete
preemption and requires removal of a case to federal court if a would-be beneficiary files an action in
state court that constitutes an attempt "to recover benefits due." See, e.g., Metro. Life Ins. Co. v.
Taylor, 481 U.S. 58 (1987); Jass v. Prudential Health Care Plan, Inc., 88 F.3d 1482 (7th Cir. 1996).
6. In the 1980s, the U.S. Supreme Court construed ERISA's preemption clause, section 514(a),
broadly, foreclosing state damage suits against fringe-benefit plans. See, e.g., Pilot Life Ins. Co. v.
Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 47-48 (1987). In this case, which involved employer-provided disability
insurance, the Court held that ERISA preempted all state tort and contract law of general applicability,
including actions for negligence. Subsequent lower court decisions extended Pilot Life to immunize
health plans against state tort actions for improperly withholding or delaying authorization for care.
See, e.g., Kuhl v. Lincoln Nat'l Health Plan of Kansas City, Inc., 999 F.2d 298 (8th Cir. 1993);
Corcoran v. United HealthCare, Inc., 965 F.2d 1321 (5th Cir. 1992).
7. The managed care industry's immunity from liability for declining to authorize care ensued
from ERISA preemption of state tort and contract remedies and ERISA's lack of an alternative, federal-
law basis for damages. Corcoran, 965 F.2d at 1321.
8. Some took their cue from a 1995 Supreme Court opinion characterizing health as a matter for
state regulation and suggesting that ERISA preemption of state law be narrowed accordingly in the
health sphere. See N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514
U.S. 645 (1995) (holding that state regulations governing employee benefit plans' payments to
hospitals were beyond the scope of ERISA preemption); see also Karen A. Jordan, Travelers
Insurance: New Support for the Argument to Restrain ERISA Pre-emption, 13 YALE J. ON REG. 255
(1996).
9. The courts' basic strategy, pursued by various doctrinal means, was to distinguish between
health care provision and health-plan administration, apply ERISA preemption only to the latter, and
characterize troublesome cost-control methods as fitting within the former. See generally Peter D.
Jacobson & Scott D. Pomfret, Form, Function, and Managed Care Torts: Achieving Fairness and
Equity in ERISA Jurisprudence, 35 Hous. L. REV. 985 (1998). Courts thereby cleared a path to tort
liability for managed care frugality that ends badly. Cost-control methods that some courts, since the
mid-1990s, have treated as issues of health care provision, not health benefits administration (and
therefore beyond ERISA's preemptive reach), include preapproval review of doctors' treatment plans
by managed care administrators, for example, Pappas v. Asbel, 768 A.2d 1089, 1093-96 (Pa. 2001),
and supervisory influence (maintained via financial incentives, administrative oversight, and the power
to select and "de-select" participating physicians) over the clinical judgment of managed care
organizations' participating physicians. See, e.g., Dukes v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 57 F.3d 350 (1995)
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As judges look to harmonize health law's disparate doctrinal strands,
what vision should guide them? Over the past decade, scholars from di-
verse ideological starting points have converged toward a single an-
swer: the law should seek to deploy resources in a systematic manner, so
as to maximize the medical benefits that every dollar buys.'I This approach
rejects physician conceptions of medical need that call for provision of care
regardless of cost when expected clinical benefits outweigh potential clini-
cal harms." It treats these conceptions as tainted by physicians' financial
self-interest and insured patients' "moral hazard," their preference for care
that they would not purchase if they had to pay the entire cost. It also envi-
sions a cultural shift that has yet to occur-the advent of widespread public
willingness to treat medical resources as scarce and to tolerate the with-
holding of beneficial care.
The Supreme Court endorsed this economics-oriented approach to the
law of health care provision in 2000, in its first-ever opinion on the regula-
tory governance of managed care.' 2 The Justices stunned observers 3 by
declaring that health care rationing is both routine in the United States and
a matter of national policy. The Court characterized the work of health pol-
icy as the making of judgments about "acceptable medical risk" and
"optimum treatment levels," and it sanctioned rewards to doctors for with-
holding care as an acceptable rationing method. 4
(rejecting ERISA preemption arguments on the ground that plaintiffs' state action against health
maintenance organizations ("HMOs"), under theories of ostensible and actual agency, addressed the
quality of medical care provided, not plan administration). Two years ago, the Supreme Court invited
judges to widen this path. See M. Gregg Bloche & Peter D. Jacobson, The Supreme Court and Bedside
Rationing, 284 JAMA 2776 (2000); Peter J. Hammer, Pegram v. Herdrich: On Peritonitis, Preemption
and the Elusive Goal of Managed Care Accountability, 26 J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y & L. 767 (2001).
The Justices characterized gatekeeping HMO physicians' cost-control efforts as "mixed" medical and
administrative activity, then placed this "mixed" activity beyond ERISA's preemptive reach. Pegram v.
Herdrich, 530 U.S. 21, 231-32 (2000).
10. See, e.g., Kenneth S. Abraham & Paul C. Weiler, Enterprise Medical Liability and the
Evolution of the American Health Care System, 108 HARV. L. REV. 381 (1994); Einer Elhauge, The
Limited Regulatory Potential of Medical Technology Assessment, 82 VA. L. REV. 1525 (1996); Einer
Elhauge, Allocating Health Care Morally, 82 CALIF. L. REV. 1449 (1994) [hereinafter Elhauge,
Allocating Health Care Morally]; Richard A. Epstein, Managed Care Under Siege, 24 J. MED. & PHIL.
434, 438-39 (1999).
11. See, e.g., SHERRY GLIED, CHRONIC CONDITION: WHY HEALTH REFORM FAILS 26-33 (1997)
(criticizing this "medicalist" perspective on health care resource allocation).
12. Pegram, 530 U.S. at 234.
13. See Robert Pear, The 'R' Word: Justice Souter Takes On a Health Care Taboo, N.Y. TIMES,
June 18, 2000, § 4, at 3.
14. Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Souter said that "inducement to ration care goes to the
very point of any HMO scheme," Pegram, 530 U.S. at 221, and that Congress has for more than
twenty-seven years promoted the creation of HMOs and thereby endorsed "the profit incentive to ration
care," id at 233. Justice Souter framed the central question in the case-whether ERISA's fiduciary
duty provisions limit HMOs' monetary rewards to doctors for withholding care-as one calling for
judgment about optimum levels of care and "unacceptably risky HMO structure." Id. at 221. The Court
declined to read ERISA to set such limits on the asserted ground that Congress is better situated than
the Court to make these requisite "judgments of social value." Id. at 365.
[Vol. 91:247
HeinOnline -- 91 Cal. L. Rev. 252 2003
2003] THE INVENTION OF HEALTH LA W
In its most pointed form, the new, economic paradigm for health care
law instructs courts and regulators to value medical services only insofar as
they boost biological functioning and to decide controversies so as to
maximize collective welfare. 5 Whether this economic reasoning will
someday tie together the disconnected strands of American health law is an
open question. But, it is making rapid progress. It is encouraging courts to
take a more favorable view of managed care organizations' cost-control
strategies, including preauthorization review of doctors' treatment plans,
financial incentives to physicians to limit care, and termination of contracts
with high-spending physicians. It is inclining some judges toward greater
deference to limit-setting provisions in health plans' contracts with con-
sumers16 and reduced deference to sick patients' wishes and expectations.
It is pushing decision makers in tort litigation and insurance-coverage dis-
putes to pay less heed to doctors' conceptions of clinical need. It has en-
couraged the erosion of legal safeguards for physician autonomy, which it
treats as a barrier to optimal clinical resource use. And it is the driving
force behind antitrust law's expanding application to medical care.' 7
This Article challenges the proposition that we can resolve legal con-
troversies in the health care sphere through traditional economic reasoning.
I argue that the systematic rationalization of medical and health-policy
The respondent, Cynthia Herdrich, had initially sued her health plan in state court, under Illinois
law, for offering financial rewards to physicians to limit care. Herdrich v. Pegram, 154 F.3d 362, 365-
66 (7th Cir. 1998), rev'd, 530 U.S. 211 (2000). The plan persuaded a federal district court to dismiss
this claim as preempted by ERISA. Id. Herdrich then recast her claim as a federal action, alleging that
financial enticements to withhold treatment violate an employee benefit plan's fiduciary duty, under
ERISA, to administer benefits "solely in the interest of the participants and beneficiaries." 29 U.S.C.
§ 1104(a)(1) (2000). She asserted that her health plan's financial incentives for physicians led her
doctor to delay an abdominal ultrasound examination. During the alleged delay, her appendix ruptured,
resulting in peritonitis, a life-threatening infection of her abdomen. The district court dismissed
Herdrich's ERISA fiduciary duty claim. Herdrich, 154 F.3d at 365-66. The Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals reinstated the claim, holding that ERISA's fiduciary duty provisions impose limits on
physicians' incentives to withhold services and warning that such incentives threaten the quality of
medical care. Id. at 373. The Supreme Court reversed, holding ERISA's fiduciary duty provisions
inapplicable to incentives to physicians to limit care. Pegram, 530 U.S. at 237.
15. In Richard Epstein's words:
[l]t is possible for the left and the right to make common cause, and to insist that health care
should be regarded as a means and not an end in itself .... The end is good health,
and... the correct normative approach is one that asks whether the next dollar spent on
health produces greater benefit than that next dollar spent on any one of a number of other
goods in the market basket.
Epstein, supra note 10, at 438-39. Unless the answer to this question is yes, social waste is occurring.
And, the paradigm's adherents hold third-party payment ensures that the answer is almost always no.
16. Such provisions include exclusions for "investigational" or "experimental" therapies, reliance
upon cost-conscious clinical practice protocols, restrictions on access to specialists and out-of-network
providers, and cost-sensitive definitions of "medical necessity."
17. See generally Clark C. Havighurst, Health Care as a (Big) Business: The Antitrust Response,
26 J. HEALTH POL., POL'V & L. 939 (2001) (reviewing history of health care antitrust law and
defending robust antitrust responses to provider collaboration that reduces options available to
consumers).
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decision making that classic welfare economics envisions is far beyond our
cognitive and moral reach. We know little about the efficacy of most of
medicine, and the complexity and variability of patients' illnesses make
large advances in this knowledge unlikely for the foreseeable future. We
are nowhere near to social consensus on how to value the benefits and
harms of therapeutic intervention. We differ profoundly over which bene-
fits and harms ought to "count," how we should measure them, and how
we should mediate between our desire for health policy that maximizes the
welfare of the many and our intimate wishes to be cared for without com-
promise. Health economists' frequent simplifying step, their treatment of
therapeutic effectiveness as the measure of medicine's social worth, disre-
gards needs that play large roles in how people value health care. The
moral and emotional import of rescue, people's fears of abandonment and
helplessness, and their yearnings for dignity in time of vulnerability are
among the humane concerns health economics typically ignores-and
could not reliably tally were it to try.
These failures feed confusion, even chaos, when health law looks to
systemwide economic rationality as the lodestar for conflict resolution. Yet
we need not abandon the quest for rationality in health law. We can and
should retrieve rationality from the province of social welfare maximiza-
tion and recast it in more pragmatic terms.18
To this end, I propose an alternative understanding of health law's
aims. This understanding concedes that medical uncertainty, people's cog-
nitive constraints and emotional needs, and persisting moral disagreements
limit the possibilities for rational health policymaking. Treating health law
as a matter of balancing costs and benefits tends to obscure these
difficulties. By collapsing competing policy considerations onto a
18. It is not my intention, in so urging, to challenge the normative desirability, in principle, of
systemic welfare maximization as a paradigm for the law of health care provision. I leave to others the
question of whether this paradigm, in theory, can encompass all that is normatively at stake in health
care law. My concern, in this Article, is the real-world manageability of this paradigm. In practice, the
"error bands" that ensue from empirical uncertainty, cognitive limitations, and normative disagreement
are too wide to enable decision makers to derive reliable answers to legal questions in the health care
sphere by reference to what will systematically maximize social welfare. To be sure, empirical doubts,
cognitive limitations, and normative disagreement beset legal decision making in many other policy
spheres. But in health care, these sources of uncertainty and variance are especially large. The
uniqueness and extraordinary complexity of each person's physiology-and, arising from this
complexity, the innumerable judgments about resource use that patients, doctors, and institutions must
make-distinguish medical care from policy areas, such as environmental protection and public utility
regulation, marked by population-wide decisions that are much fewer in number. Medical care,
moreover, is unique for the poignancy with which individuals' often desperate claims clash with
population-wide priorities. We cannot resolve such clashes simply by according trump value to the
population-wide perspective, as welfare economics is wont to do, unless we utterly disregard
individuals' yearnings to be seen noninstrumentally as ends in themselves. Economic thinking may
well be able to incorporate this individualized, Kantian perspective, but the effort to so adapt the
welfare-economics paradigm to incorporate this view, by somehow quantifying these human
aspirations, is fraught with fuzziness and indeterminacy of the sort that economists typically eschew.
[Vol. 91:247
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one-dimensional axis, the cost-benefit balancing model diverts attention
from the underlying substance of legal disagreements. The approach I urge
encourages judges, litigants, and society to focus on this underlying sub-
stance. It reframes health law's disputes to highlight society's disagree-
ments about health care's value and purposes. By so doing, it empowers
courts to address these underlying disagreements in more coherent, pre-
dictable fashion in disparate doctrinal contexts. Beyond this, the enhanced
visibility of core disagreements, and the law's handling of them, promotes
public deliberation over the desirability of the answers the law provides.
This openness, in turn, expands possibilities for public-regarding political
choice in health matters and shrinks the space for special-interest-group
influence.
In Part I, I consider the use of welfare economics as a tool for resolv-
ing health law's main questions. 9 First, I review the standard story of
waste that lies behind most welfare-economics thinking about health care
provision. This story's central claim-that excess consumer demand, cre-
ated by health insurance, results in large-scale social waste-has much
support. But without undergirding moral judgments about how to achieve
distributive fairness, how to measure people's health preferences, and how
to manage medicine's many uncertainties, the standard story of waste can-
not yield conclusions about optimal resource use. I argue that disagreement
about how to make these moral judgments renders the idea of insurance-
induced excess demand too fuzzy or indeterminate to be of much use to
legal decision makers.
I then address the related problem of valuing the results of medical
care for purposes of using law to maximize social welfare. Economics ap-
proaches to this problem have in common the rejection of old-fashioned
professional paternalism, the idea that doctors know best, in favor of defer-
ence to consumer preferences. But these approaches differ in how they
seek to discern consumer preferences, and the different approaches yield
sharply conflicting results. Choosing from among these approaches and
results is a moral, not a technical, matter. Americans' sharp disagreements
about how to make these choices widen the scope for conflict and uncer-
tainty over the social-welfare-maximizing perspective's implications for
law. I conclude Part I by contending that even if this conflict and uncer-
tainty could be reduced to manageable levels, citizens' and policymakers'
psychological limitations would make the ideal of consistent, systemwide
cost-benefit trade-offs impractical in the health sphere.
19. This discussion of welfare economics in the health sphere is restricted to the issues most
central to American health care law. For consideration of the application of welfare-economics norms
to wider distributive and other health policy questions, see Uwe E. Reinhardt, Can Efficiency in Health
Care Be Left to the Market?, 26 J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y & L. 967 (2001); see also THOMAS H. RICE,
THE ECONOMICS OF HEALTH RECONSIDERED (1998).
2003]
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In Part II, I briefly consider the welfare-maximization model's inroads
in five illustrative areas of legal conflict: medical malpractice, health-
insurance coverage, protections for professional autonomy, antitrust, and
regulation of capital investment. Within each of these areas, I contend, the
welfare-maximization model has not only failed to reduce the law's incon-
sistencies and uncertainties; it has contributed to them, thereby increasing
the possibilities for destructive conflict.
In Part III, I present an alternative model for the quest to harmonize
health law. This alternative approach takes a pragmatic account of
Americans' conflicting expectations of medicine-expectations that often
lie unseen behind conflicting claims about what social-welfare maximiza-
tion requires. In addition to promoting and restoring health, these expecta-
tions include protection against abandonment, provision of comfort and
support, regard for people's dignity at their most vulnerable moments, and
universal access to care as an expression of our common humanity.2" The
model for health law that I propose renders these expectations explicit and
highlights the tensions between them. It thereby directs legal decision
makers' attention to litigants' (and society's) disagreements about how to
manage conflict between these expectations. It does not offer single,
"right" answers to legal questions. Rather, it channels legal reasoning to
take a richer, more open account of health care's conflicting purposes than
does the language of welfare economics. By so doing, it enables legal deci-
sion makers to achieve greater coherence and predictability across doc-
trinal settings over time. It also fosters public reconsideration of the
judgments that courts and regulators make.
Part IV suggests how this alternative model might guide the develop-
ment of health law. I briefly explore the model's implications for the five
illustrative spheres of legal conflict I consider in Part II. I do not offer a
detailed doctrinal roadmap, as such a project is far beyond my scope here.2
My limited purpose, in Part IV, is to offer a glimpse of how this approach
might work in practice and how it differs from the welfare-economics vi-
sion for health law. It pursues coherence and predictability, but it accepts
untidy pragmatism as it mediates between Americans' contradictory aspira-
tions and fears about health and disease.
20. Borrowing from Amartya Sen, one can distinguish between "culmination outcomes"-final
results disconnected from the processes by which they are achieved-and "comprehensive outcomes,"
which take account of both final results and the processes by which these results are brought about.
AMARTYA KUMAR SEN, DEVELOPMENT As FREEDOM 27 (1999). Standard welfare-economics thinking
values health care exclusively in terms of a "culmination outcome," the impact of medical care on
health status. This Article looks to "comprehensive outcomes," including feelings of being cared for,
respect for personal dignity, and the deepened sense of community that health care can bring about.
21. Other, forthcoming work will flesh out, in different common-law and statutory contexts, the
approach to harmonization of health care law that this Article proposes.
[Vol. 91:247
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I
WELFARE MAXIMIZATION AND THE ENIGMA OF EFFICIENCY
A. The Standard Story of Waste
Economics-oriented scholars from a range of ideological vantage
points tell a now-standard story about inefficiency in health care. This story
is consistent in theory with a variety of positions on the role of government
in the health sector, from support for universal, publicly financed and ad-
ministered medical care2" to reliance on minimally regulated markets. Yet
the standard story is most often invoked by supporters of the market-driven
restructuring of health care. This restructuring, its proponents argue, prom-
ises to rationalize the allocation of medical resources while respecting in-
dividuals' preferences to a greater extent than could any publicly
administered process.
Adherents to the standard story start with a compelling account of
waste within classic, fee-for-service health care. This account begins with
well-insured patients who assert their medical preferences without regard
for medical costs. Insulated from these costs by insurance and advised by
physicians with a financial stake in the provision of more services, patients
demand all potentially beneficial care.23 In economics terms, well-insured
patients and their doctors push demand up the slope of the clinical cost-
benefit curve to a plateau at which further clinical intervention (and ex-
pense) yields no additional health benefits-so-called flat-of-the-curve
medicine.
22. Government could attempt to identify and root out inefficiencies in health care by developing
systemwide cost-benefit trade-off principles and requiring doctors and patients to abide by them.
Indeed, some advocates of publicly funded medical care for all have incorporated cost containment
along these lines into their proposals. See, e.g., THEODORE R. MARMOR, UNDERSTANDING HEALTH
CARE REFORM 218-21 (1994); Dan E. Beauchamp & Ronald L. Rouse, Universal New York Health
Care-A Single-Payer Strategy Linking Cost Control and Universal Access, 323 NEw ENG. J. MED.
640 (1990). Proponents of publicly funded and administered health care coverage often argue that
political accountability makes government the most legitimate maker of hard decisions concerning the
costs and benefits of medical treatments.
23. To be more precise, this account holds that fully insured patients demand all care with
expected therapeutic benefits (the sum of the probability multiplied by the magnitude of the benefit, for
all possible benefits) that outweigh expected adverse health effects (the sum of the probability
multiplied by the magnitude of the adverse effect, for all possible adverse effects). Patients with less-
than-complete insurance (that is, those with unmet deductible or copayment requirements) demand all
care with expected therapeutic benefits that outweigh expected adverse health effects plus out-of-
pocket expenses (that is, copayments). This story assumes the quantifiability and comparability of
potential clinical benefits and harms (through Bayesian methods for the valuation of unrealized
possibilities), as well as the commensurability of adverse health outcomes and financial expenses.
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FIGURE 1
"Flat-of-the-Curve"
Medical Care
Health
Benefits
Cost (Medical Care Inputs)
The story allows that the Hippocratic ethic of loyalty to patients may dis-
courage provision of lucrative services that do more medical harm than
good. But the story presents this professional ethic, in conjunction with the
reduced cost sensitivity (moral hazard) introduced by insurance, as both an
instrument of physician financial self-interest and a catalyst of irrationally
high health care spending.
This story has inspired some to seek to constrain clinical spending
through such regulatory means as global budget ceilings,24 limits on capital
investment,25 and promulgation of comprehensive clinical-practice proto-
cols that incorporate systemic cost-benefit trade-offs.2 6 The former two
approaches target the supply side, leaving bedside allocation decisions to
clinicians and local administrators, who must cope with supply and de-
mand mismatches and the resulting queuing of well-insured patients.27 The
24. See, e.g., Uwe E. Reinhardt, Operating Under a Global Budget: Perspectives from the
United States and Abroad, in CHANGING THE HEALTH CARE SYSTEM: MODELS FROM HERE AND
ABROAD 68, 70 (Institute of Medicine ed., 1994); Richard B. Saltman, Single-Source Financing
Systems: A Solution for the United States? 268 JAMA 774 (1992).
25. See generally Sallyanne Payton & Rhoda M. Powsner, Regulation Through the Looking
Glass: Hospitals, Blue Cross, and Certificate-of-Need, 79 MICH. L. REV. 203 (1980) (criticizing
regulatory constraints on capital investment through so-called certificate-of-need programs).
26. See Mark V. Pauly, Practice Guidelines: Can They Save Money? Should They?, 23 J.L.
MED. & ETHICS 65 (1995).
27. See Jeffrey E. Harris, The Internal Organization of Hospitals: Some Economic Implications,
8 BELL J. ECON. 467 (1977).
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issuance of practice protocols for regulatory purposes is more ambitious.
This demand-side approach seeks to centralize clinical allocation decisions,
giving doctors detailed rules to apply when using collective resources on
their patients' behalf.
More market-oriented adherents to the standard story object that po-
litically accountable decision makers are unable to set the painful limits
necessary to prevent irrationally high health care spending,28 that regula-
tory methods of limit setting deny choice to individuals,29 and that the work
of developing and implementing spending ceilings or comprehensive prac-
tice protocols is beyond the administrative capabilities of government.
They urge instead that the task of limit-setting be left to contractual order-
ing between medical-care consumers, payers, and providers. In Clark
Havighurst's words:
Because the idea of rationing care-depriving people of beneficial
services on the ground that they are too costly-is so controversial,
it should seem wise to make whatever rationing occurs a matter of
contract rather than public compulsion. If health care must be
rationed-and, in some sense, it must-it would seem preferable to
have it done with the consumer's consent.3"
The advent of managed health plans, Havighurst and others argue,
makes such limit setting possible. The key to private limit setting, and to
preservation of personal choice, is the requirement that health-plan pur-
chasers make medical-spending decisions before the onset of clinical need.
Seated in the employee-benefits office or otherwise shopping the medical
marketplace, consumers can choose the plan (and budget limits and re-
source-allocation policies) that best fits their health care "tastes" and their
comparative preferences for medical coverage versus other goods.3 When
employers offer only one or a few health-coverage options, this line of ar-
gument discerns de facto consumer choice by treating the employer as a
good-enough purchasing agent for its employees. Managed health plans,
the argument goes, can implement these ex ante consumer choices-and
thereby rationalize medical spending-through clinical practice styles that
reflect systemic cost-benefit trade-off policies. Unlike regulatory means of
effecting such policies, competition between private health plans permits
experimentation with diverse means for doing so-and simultaneous
28. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, MORTAL PERIL: OUR INALIENABLE RIGHT TO HEALTH CARE 174
(1997).
29. CLARK HAVIGHURST, HEALTH CARE CHOICES: PRIVATE CONTRACTS AS INSTRUMENTS OF
HEALTH REFORM 34 (1995) ("[W]ell meaning legislative attempts to fix deficiencies in the de facto
regulatory system... might complete the regulatory takeover.... Few would be aware enough of what
was happening even to mourn as another stake was driven into the heart of private contracts as
instruments of choice and individual liberty.").
30. Id. at 115.
31. See Elhauge, Allocating Health Care Morally, supra note 10, at 1451.
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satisfaction of varying personal preferences as to these means. Among
competing plans, cost-benefit trade-off policies may differ, but this varia-
tion better serves varying consumer preferences than can any single, state-
mandated cost-benefit trade-off scheme.
This market-oriented version of the standard story calls for govern-
ment to stay out of the fray, except, perhaps, to channel subsidies to the
poor (to give them access to a decent range of coverage options) 32 and,
more controversially, to rectify market failures.33 This overarching concep-
tion of government's role frames debate within the paradigm over what the
law and policy of medical-care provision should seek to accomplish. It pre-
sents health care law and policy as an adjuvant to the market-driven quest
to maximize collective welfare. In so doing, it rests the orderly develop-
ment of health law and policy upon our ability to reach stable understand-
ings, in myriad circumstances, of what welfare maximization requires.
B. Moral Hazard
The standard story of waste in health care provision presents insur-
ance as the engine of clinical inefficiency. Medical insurance, the story
goes, creates "moral hazard" by enabling patients to purchase care for a
fraction of its actual price and its true cost to society. 34 This fraction, in the
form of deductible and copayment requirements, sets the threshold above
which the perceived value of a medical service must rise to prompt a deci-
sion to purchase it. Patients experience only this fractional cost because
they-or employers or government-have already incurred insurance pre-
miums, which collectively cover most medical costs. In turn, the story
holds, physicians evolve standards of care that reflect the false cost-benefit
balance signal sent by purchase decisions restrained only by this fractional
cost. This signal, the product of insurance-augmented buying power, spurs
provision of existing medical services at higher-than-optimal levels. More
significantly, from a financial perspective, it overstimulates investment in
the development of new clinical technologies, reallocating resources
32. HAVIGHURST, supra note 29, at 34.
33. See, e.g., Alain Enthoven, The History and Principles of Managed Competition, HEALTH
AFF., Supp. 1993, at 24; Alain Enthoven & Richard Kronick, A Consumer-Choice Health Plan for the
1990s: Universal Health Insurance in a System Designed to Promote Quality and Economy, 320 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 94 (1989).
34. See Martin S. Feldstein, Hospital Cost Inflation: A Study of Nonprofit Price Dynamics, 61
AM. ECON. REV. 853 (1971); see also Willard G. Manning et al., Health Insurance and the Demandfor
Medical Care: Evidence from a Randomized Experiment, 77 AM. EcoN. REV. 251, 258-59 (1987)
(concluding that people are more likely to use medical services when their out-of-pocket costs are
lower). But see Cam Donaldson & Karen Gerard, Countering Moral Hazard in Public and Private
Health Care Systems: A Review of Recent Evidence, 18 J. Soc. POL'Y 235, 248 (1989) (concluding that
free care at the point of delivery does not necessarily result in higher health care costs through
increased moral hazard).
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inefficiently from other sectors of the economy and causing medical costs
to rise more quickly than the general rate of inflation.35
This account, embraced by virtually all health economists, employs
the notion of "moral hazard" in a way that obscures key normative ques-
tions. To see this, consider the difference between this usage of "moral
hazard" and classic "moral hazard" in the casualty insurance context. The
classic "moral hazard" of insurance is its effect on insureds' willingness to
take risk.36 Homeowners' insurance, for example, is thought to make the
backyard-grill enthusiast marginally less likely to take care, and more will-
ing to risk fiery destruction of her property, than she would be without
coverage. In theory, the uninsured patio chef will take the "right" amount
of risk, striking a socially optimal balance between the pleasures of care-
free cooking and the prospect of harm to her property.37 The chef with fire
insurance, however, will take too little care (from a social-welfare-
optimizing perspective), since she can rationally disregard or discount the
prospect of an insured loss. The key idea here is that insurance changes
risk-taking behavior-in a manner that reduces social welfare.38 This is an
observable effect, not a counterfactual proposition, though its precise
measurement is difficult in practice.
"Moral hazard" is used differently in discussion of medical insurance.
To be sure, health insurance does carry a measure of classic "moral
hazard": the well-insured person may be marginally more likely to ski,
smoke, bungee jump, or eat Brie. But health care economists invoke the
notion of moral hazard to characterize the influence of insurance on con-
sumers' medical-purchasing decisions, not their risk-taking behavior. By
augmenting clinical buying power, medical insurance lifts consumers'
medical demand curves from a starting point of zero when people confront
illnesses treatable only at costs exceeding their incomes and life savings.
Such costs make purchase of such treatment impossible without insurance.
For the vast majority of Americans, hospital stays of several days or more
fit into this category.39
35. See Annetine Gelijns & Nathan Rosenberg, The Dynamics of Technological Change in
Medicine, HEALTH AFF., Summer 1994, at 28.
36. See STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW 194-97 (1987).
37. This example assumes, of course, that our chef neither underestimates nor overestimates the
likelihood or magnitude of the potential harm, is neither risk averse nor risk seeking, and lives in
sufficiently isolated splendor that she can create risk only for herself, not her neighbors.
38. This reduction in social welfare is counterbalanced by the social benefits of loss spreading,
which derive from the increasing marginal disutility of larger and larger losses suffered by any one
person.
39. In 1998, the median income for a family of four was $56,061. U.S. Census Bureau, Median
Income for Four Person Families by State, at http://www.census.gov/hhes/income/4person.html (last
revised Aug. 22 2002). According to an analysis of the benefits paid by Mutual of Omaha, the 1998
cost of one day of inpatient services in an American hospital was $2,510. MUTUAL OF OMAHA
COMPANIES' GROUP BENEFIT SERVICES ANN. REP., CURRENT TRENDS IN HEALTH CARE & DENTAL
COSTS & UTILIZATION: 2001 ED. 5 (2001), at http://www.nichsa.org.
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By contrast, our home-owning backyard chef is able in fact, with or
without fire insurance, to take the different levels of care mentioned earlier.
It is financially and physically possible for her to take a variety of precau-
tions that reduce her risk of burning her house down. We can thus compare
her levels of care, and the resulting fire risks, with and without insurance.
This comparison, in turn, enables us to estimate the actual waste from more
frequent fiery backyard miscues that the moral hazard of fire insurance in-
troduces.4" However, for medical care that is too costly to buy without
health insurance, we cannot measure real-world moral hazard-induced
waste by comparing patients' purchasing decisions with and without health
insurance. We can easily observe that the twenty-seven-year-old school-
teacher with liver failure will not spend $150,000 on a lifesaving liver
transplant unless her health insurance covers it. But unless we treat this
intervention's value to the individual as determined by the unsubsidized
price she is willing and able to pay for it,41 we cannot treat this observation
as evidence that insurance coverage for this transplant induces waste. To
assay moral hazard here, and to discern waste, we must compare her deci-
sion about a real-world option (using her insurance to purchase the trans-
plant) against a hypothetical, even imaginary, standard-the choice she
would make if she had to pay the full price out of pocket and had $150,000
or more in the bank or available on credit.
Unless we infuse content into this hypothetical standard of compari-
son, we cannot determine whether insurance, in this instance, induces
wasteful medical spending. The content of this standard, though, comes
from our counterfactual judgment-our subjective ideas about what a per-
son in imaginary circumstances would choose to do. These ideas are not
the product of empirical observation of actual behavior. It is the possibility
of such observation that gives classic moral hazard in the casualty insur-
ance context its analytic power as an objective, market-based measure of
economic waste.42 Counterfactual thinking about what a patient without
insurance would choose lacks this empirical basis. It rests on our value-
laden judgments about how to define the counterfactual situation.
For example, almost none of us would favor, as a counterfactual stan-
dard, our twenty-seven-year-old schoolteacher's forgoing of the liver
transplant, absent insurance or other access to the necessary $150,000. To
accept this standard would be to treat the social value of a person's desire
to live (and of the loss to others from a person's avoidable death) as so
40. Any estimation will, in practice, be exceedingly difficult, but the difficulties stem from
practical problems of data collection and aggregation. The task is not, in theory, impossible.
41. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Wealth Maximization and Judicial Decision-Making, 4 INT'L
REV. L. & ECON. 131 (1984).
42. Its objectivity as a measure of waste is not complete, since it rests on value-laden
assumptions about the translation of different levels of care and different probabilities of different kinds
of casualty losses into dollar terms.
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linked to one's financial resources that inability to pay for lifesaving treat-
ment proves its social wastefulness. Our rejection of this standard rests on
our shared moral conviction that the value of a person's life should not be
treated purely as a function of his or her wealth.43
On the other hand, many (including most health economists) would
support, as a counterfactual standard, the decision about the transplant that
our schoolteacher would make were an insurer to simply issue her a
$150,000 check, on proof of medical need, without conditions on its use.
That this is a counterfactual standard is confirmed by the fact that health
insurers do not write such policies, presumably because of lack of con-
sumer demand44 or the risk of opportunistic claims of medical need. 45 This
standard is similarly laden with moral content: its application calls for
speculation that entails normative choices. Its moral content derives from
the effect of our schoolteacher's financial and other life circumstances
upon her decision. The poorer her economic prospects and the more pres-
sure she might feel to leave the $150,000 to needy loved ones, the less
likely it would seem that she would choose the transplant. This standard
thus ties the transplant's social value to the patient's finances and other life
pressures. Health economists' acceptance of this tie constitutes a moral
decision to accept some linkage between valuation of a person's life and
her wealth and other life circumstances. 6 Moreover, this standard cannot
be applied without speculating about what the patient would do in the
counterfactual situation. Such speculation is an exercise in imagination, not
inference.47 We cannot know how her immersion in this extraordinary
situation would influence her feelings and preferences.48 We can, at best,
43. Put in other terms, life-prolonging health care is a "merit good"-something we (or, at least,
most of us) do not believe should be available solely on the basis of people's wealth.
44. Consumer disinterest in such policies could reflect widespread desire to precommit to
spending insurance proceeds on health care, rather than keeping them, in the event of illness, so as to
avoid agonizing decisions-for example, a choice between life-prolonging intensive care and heroic
forgoing of these services so as to leave an insurance-derived financial legacy to one's children.
45. The risk of opportunism would be greater than it is for conventional health-insurance
policies, since claimants could obtain large sums of money to keep (without having to endure noxious
medical procedures).
46. To be sure, the connection between wealth and the value of life is less direct here than it is for
the (almost) universally abhorrent standard discussed previously, since the $150,000 check renders all
recipients financially able to obtain the transplant, while the previous scenario makes it economically
impossible for anyone without $150,000 to choose the transplant.
47. Could we simply ask the patient, at the moment of clinical decision, whether, if she were
presented with a choice between the transplant and $150,000 in cash, she would choose the transplant?
We could, but if the purpose of the question is to determine whether the transplant would be wasteful in
her case-and thus should be withheld from her in the interest of making medical care more efficient-
then she would have a life-and-death incentive not to answer honestly if in fact she thinks she would
choose the cash. If she answers this hypothetical question honestly, then in real life she will be denied
the transplant.
48. The context dependence of preferences is empirically well established and is a focus of
ongoing research. E.g., Douglass H. Wedell & Jonathan C. Pettybone, Preference and the Contextual
Basis ofIdeals in Judgment and Choice, 128 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. GEN. 346 (1999).
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reflect empathically on the trade-offs she might make. But empathy re-
quires that we imagine ourselves in her (counterfactual) place. To do so
imports our own feelings, values, and preferences into our speculation
about what she would decide. Application of this counterfactual standard
thus rests on contestable normative judgment.
One might respond to the need for normative judgment by looking to
more objective methods for the social valuation of medical services. Many
such approaches are conceivable, and I address only a small sample of
them here. To begin with, one could borrow from one of the inventive
techniques economists have developed for the empirical valuation of life
and health. These methods, often based on statistical measurement of the
wage premiums workers receive for incurring on-the-job risks, yield prices
on life and on states of well-being.49 By adjusting these prices for the in-
cremental life-saving potential of particular clinical interventions (assum-
ing this potential is measurable), one can derive empirically based
estimates of the social values of medical services. Analogously, one might
extrapolate such estimates from measurements of the cost-benefit trade-
offs implicit in consumers' decisions about the purchase of low-cost clini-
cal services (for example, diagnostic screening tests) not covered by insur-
ance. Such methodology takes valuation of medical care and estimation of
insurance-induced waste out of the realm of purely subjective speculation.
But it does not connect the measurement of insurance-induced waste to
observation of actual consumer choices in medical markets. It draws its
raw material for valuation-observations of people's risk-dollar trade-
offs-from different market settings. This approach runs contrary to evi-
dence that the trade-offs we make between money and health vary greatly
depending on the context of the decision." Our apparent willingness to pay
much more, per unit of risk reduction, for medical treatment of life-
threatening illness than for equivalent increments of risk reduction when
risks are relatively low (as they tend to be in labor markets) suggests that
deriving medical risk-dollar trade-offs from labor and other market settings
would introduce large errors.
But perhaps error of this sort is in the eye of the beholder. Advocates
of this methodology might respond that risk-dollar trade-offs observed in
labor and other markets where health risks are relatively low are better in-
dicators of the social value of life and good health than is the willingness
of patients with dread disease to pay dearly for a small additional prospect
of survival or improved functioning. If so, then they hold promise as base-
lines for estimation of insurance-generated waste. But preference for these
baselines over the more anxious, even desperate, risk-dollar trade-offs of
49. See W. Kip Viscusi, FATAL TRADEOFFS: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE RESPONSIBILITIES FOR RISK
34-41 (1992).
50. See infra text accompanying notes 116-31.
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sick patients would be an overtly political choice, decoupled from the
medical marketplace. There is no nonpolitical, nonmoral reason for choos-
ing this methodology over other techniques that are likewise not based on
observed behavior in the medical marketplace, such as public-opinion sur-
veys,5' focus groups, or rulings by regulatory agencies. 2 Indeed, there are
reasons for preferring openly political methods to extrapolations from mar-
ket behavior.53
My point is not that we should choose political methods or any par-
ticular approach. It is, rather, that the moral-hazard concept as convention-
ally applied to health care is incapable of generating estimates of waste
based solely on empirical observation of consumer behavior in medical
markets. We can judge the magnitude of insurance-induced inefficiency
only by reference to a standard with moral and political content-a stan-
dard that reflects social choices about which benefits and costs to count and
how to count them. However we craft such a standard, its use to measure
insurance-induced waste departs sharply from the ideal of deference to in-
dividuals' expressed preferences. This ideal is central both to free-market
economics and to the principle of informed consent. This is not to say that
invoking moral hazard in the medical setting makes no sense or that we
should always defer to patients' expressed preferences. Insulating patients
from most of the costs of medical treatment, and virtually the entire cost of
the most expensive care, surely induces some misallocation of social re-
sources. The dilemma for policymakers, including legal decision makers,
working within the systemic welfare-maximization paradigm, is that the
dimensions of this resource misallocation are indeterminate without nor-
mative choices-moral and political judgments-of the kind I have just
described. Our underlying disagreements about how to make these choices
51. See OR. HEALTH SERVS. COMM'N, PRIORITIZATION OF HEALTH SERVICES: A REPORT TO THE
GOVERNOR AND LEGISLATURE (1991); Oregon Medicaid Rationing Experiment: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Health and the Env't of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 102d Cong., 1st
Sess. 19 (1991) (testimony of Tina Castanares, Or. Health Servs. Comm.) (describing use of public-
opinion polls in designing Medicaid rationing plan).
52. See John Gardner, HCFA Revives Proposal for Cost-Effectiveness Rule, 26 MOD.
HEALTHCARE 70 (1996). The Health Care Financing Administration ("HCFA") has sought to make
cost-effectiveness a component of its definition of "reasonable and necessary," employed to qualify
treatments for Medicare reimbursement, but the agency has encountered political resistance.
53. From the communitarian and "civic republican" perspectives, deliberative public decision
making may be preferable on the ground that political engagement engenders a less self-centered, more
public-regarding outlook, deserving of priority over individuals' private choices. See Cass R. Sunstein,
Legal Interference with Private Preferences, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 1129, 1132-33 (1986). A standard
rejoinder (from public-choice theorists and their sympathizers) is that idealized public decision making
of this sort is either rare or nonexistent and that self-serving interest groups more typically exert such
disproportionate influence on political processes that markets do better at approximating the public
good. See Henry N. Butler & Jonathan R. Macey, Health Care Reform: Perspectives from the
Economic Theory of Regulation and the Economic Theory of Statutory Interpretation, 79 CORNELL L.
REV. 1434 (1994).
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translate into ongoing conflict, inconsistency, and instability in the legal
and regulatory governance of health care provision.
C. The Problem of Medical Uncertainty
The standard story of waste also accommodates the growing realiza-
tion that many, even most, medical decisions are not evidence based and
that uncertainty about treatment efficacy pervades clinical practice. This
realization is not essential to the standard account of wasteful clinical
spending. Even if we had scientific evidence as to the efficacy of all medi-
cal interventions, the account of insurance-induced waste just discussed
would have much force. Uncertainty about the value of medical interven-
tions is an obstacle to the standard story's central policy prescrip-
tion: systematic allocation of limited clinical resources so as to maximize
the aggregate medical benefits our clinical dollars buy. Absent information
about the efficacy of clinical measures, neither markets nor government
can make the necessary cost-benefit trade-offs. Those committed to some
form of this policy prescription must and do urge a comprehensive set of
responses to the problem of uncertainty about medical care's effectiveness.
Unfortunately, these responses go only a small way toward alleviating this
intractable problem. The result is another, irreducible sphere of indetermi-
nacy about what is rational and another nidus of legal and regulatory con-
flict.
Before the mid-1970s, discussion of the economic implications of un-
certainty in medical markets centered on the problem of patients' ignorance
and tended to presume knowledgeable physicians.54 By the 1980s, how-
ever, reports of wide variation in clinical-practice patterns between differ-
ent geographic areas55 began to draw researchers' and commentators'
attention to the empirical foundations of medical decision making.56 Clini-
cal judgment faired poorly under this scrutiny. Most clinical practice is not
evidence based.57 To some degree, this reflects practicing physicians'
54. Kenneth Arrow's classic 1963 account of the economics of uncertainty in medicine is
perhaps the best example. Arrow sought to explain the medical profession's fiduciary ethic as a market
response to the potential for patient mistrust created by the knowledge gap between patient and
physician. Kenneth J. Arrow, Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care, 53 AM. ECON.
REV. 941 (1963). From a 2003 vantage point, Arrow seems almost quaintly confident that physicians
know the efficacy of what they do.
55. See, e.g., Mark R. Chassin et al.," Does Inappropriate Use Explain Geographic Variations in
the Use of Health Care Services?, 258 JAMA 2533 (1987); Leon Eisenberg & Paul H. Wise, What Do
Regional Variations in the Rates of Hospitalization of Children Really Mean?, 320 NEw ENG. J. MED.
1209 (1989); John E. Wennberg et al., Small Area Variations in Health Care Delivery, 182 SCIENCE
1102 (1973).
56. See David L. Sackett & William M.C. Rosenberg, The Need for Evidence-Based Medicine,
88. J. ROYAL SOC'v MED. 620 (1995); John E. Wennberg, Dealing with Medical Practice
Variations: A Proposal for Action, HEALTH AFF., Summer 1984, at 6-32.
57. See INST. OF MED., GUIDELINES FOR CLINICAL PRACTICE: FROM DEVELOPMENT TO USE
(1992).
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failure to take full advantage of available data from clinical trials and other
scientific sources.58 But scientific research has not, thus far, yielded con-
clusory information about the efficacy of more than a small portion of phy-
sicians' clinical decisions. Although some adherents to the standard story
understate the import of this problem, others squarely acknowledge it.
They urge, in response, a large-scale program of clinical-outcomes re-
search, funded by public and private sources and conducted by academic
institutions, government agencies, and health plans.59 They hold to the
conviction that such research can, in the foreseeable future, produce a
comprehensive empirical basis for medical practice.
This empirical foundation, the argument holds, will make possible the
development of comprehensive clinical-practice protocols, incorporating
both relevant clinical-outcomes data and agreed-upon cost-benefit trade-off
principles. Here, the standard story's central policy prescription separates
into many strands, reflecting our society's disparate ideas about distribu-
tive justice and deference to individuals' preferences. Some urge a single,
society-wide cost-benefit trade-off norm, imposed, perhaps, by a single,
public payer, government regulators, or the courts.6" Others argue for legal
acceptance of multiple tiers of cost-benefit trade-off rules and standards of
care, adhered to by different health plans with different market prices and
subscribed to by consumers with different levels of wealth and coverage
preferences and needs.6 Proponents of this family of approaches have con-
ceived myriad, ingenious methods for measuring and comparing the bene-
fits of medical interventions by assaying the opinions of relevant consumer
groups," whether subscribers to particular health plans or more
58. See generally John M. Eisenberg & Eric C. Schneider, Strategies and Methods for Aligning
Current and Best Medical Practices: The Role of Information Technologies, 168 W.J. MED. 311
(1998) (urging educational interventions to increase use of clinical evidence in medical decision
making).
59. See, e.g., Carolyn M. Clancy & John M. Eisenberg, Outcomes Research: Measuring the End
Results of Health Care, 282 SCIENCE 245 (1998); Michele Robinson, PROs Use Medical Practice
Standards to Assess Quality, HOSPITALS, Oct. 20, 1988, at 19. See generally Wendy K. Mariner,
Outcomes Assessment in Health Care Reform: Promise and Limitations, 20 AM. J.L. & MED. 37
(1994).
60. See M. Susan Marquis & Stephen H. Long, Federalism and Health System Reform, 278
JAMA 514 (1997); Edith Rasell, An Equitable Way to Pay for Universal Coverage, 29 INT'L J.
HEALTH SERVICES 179 (1999); see also Beauchamp & Rouse, supra note 22.
61. See Elhauge, Allocating Health Care Morally, supra note 10; Clark Havighurst, Rational
Capacity: Right-Sizing Delivery in the Health Systems Era, 30 HEALTH SYS. REV. 25 (1997); E. Haavi
Morreim, Managed Care, Ethics and Academic Health Centers: Maximizing Potential, Minimizing
Drawbacks, 72 ACAD. MED. 332 (1997); E. Haavi Morreim, Cost Containment and the Standard of
Medical Care, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 1719 (1987).
62. See, e.g., Peter A. Ubel et al., Societal Value, the Person Trade-Off, and the Dilemma of
Whose Values to Measure for Cost-Effectiveness Analysis, 9 HEALTH ECON. 127 (2000). These
methods typically assay consumers' preferences (ex ante) at the onset of illness or injury (and medical
need); thus they typically assume the superiority of the ex ante perspective over the perspectives of sick
patients as a vantage point for valuing clinical outcomes.
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inclusive populations. Such measurements and comparisons could, in the-
ory, make it possible to fashion comprehensive clinical-practice protocols
tailored to fit health plans' resource constraints and the preferences of plan
participants.
The enormous appeal of this answer to the problem of medical uncer-
tainty belies its serious shortcomings. To begin with, medical history coun-
sels modesty. At least since the eighteenth century, clinical idealists have
aspired to recast medicine as a systematic compilation of evidence-based
rules of practice, centrally administered and enforced.63 That this recurring
hope remains unfulfilled invites at least the suspicion that intractable prob-
lems stand in the way. Indeed, this suspicion preoccupied some eighteenth-
century commentators, including a French observer who cautioned:
The science of man is concerned with too complicated an object, it
embraces a multitude of too varied facts, it operates on too subtle
and too numerous elements always to give to the immense
combinations of which it is capable the uniformity, evidence, and
certainty that characterize the physical sciences and mathematics.64
The link between biomedical complexity and uncertainty is still with
us. It vexes contemporary efforts to create a comprehensive science of
clinical outcomes. The gold standard for outcomes research is the random-
ized, prospective, double-blind clinical trial, a scientific experiment ele-
gantly designed to yield useful knowledge in the face of complexity. The
prospective clinical trial tests alternative treatments or other interventions
by factoring out confounding influences, then observing a small number of
outcome indices.65 Current ethical norms severely limit the use of such tri-
als: if researchers have good reason to believe that one course of treatment
is more efficacious than another, they may not proceed with a comparative
trial of the two.66 Prospective trials are thus difficult or impossible to
63. See MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE BIRTH OF THE CLINIC: AN ARCHAEOLOGY OF MEDICAL
PERCEPTION 27-32 (A.M. Sheridan Smith trans., 1973). The idea of clinical practice guidelines dates at
least to the Old Testament: Leviticus prescribes detailed rules for the treatment and prevention of a
variety of ailments. See, e.g., Lev. 13:10-11 ("[A]nd the priest shall make an examination, and if there
is a white swelling in the skin, which has turned the hair white, and there is quick raw flesh in the
swelling, it is a chronic leprosy in the skin of his body.").
64. FOUCAULT, supra note 63, at 97 (quoting C.L. Dumas).
65. See LEON GORDIS, ASSESSING THE EFFICACY OF PREVENTIVE AND THERAPEUTIC
MEASURES: RANDOMIZED TRIALS IN EPIDEMIOLOGY 89-96 (1996); see also THE CLINICAL RESEARCH
PROCESS IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY (Gary M. Matoren ed., 1984).
66. More precisely, it is "generally accepted" that "the investigators [must] be able to state an
honest null hypothesis," that is, that "there is no scientifically validated reason to predict" the
superiority of one therapy over another. ROBERT J. LEVINE, ETHICS AND REGULATION OF CLINICAL
RESEARCH 187 (2d ed. 1986). Clinical trials of less expensive HIV antiviral treatment regimens in less
developed countries have engendered sharp ethical criticism. See Marcia Angell, The Ethics of Clinical
Research in the Third World, 337 NEW ENG. J. MED. 847 (1997). But see Ruth Faden & Nancy Kass,
Editorial, HIV Research, Ethics, and the Developing World, 88 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 548 (1998)
(arguing that the trials are defensible, on pragmatic grounds, when more expensive treatments would
likely be unavailable).
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employ, under current rules, to measure the magnitudes of known differ-
ences in efficacy-knowledge essential to the making of-cost-benefit trade-
offs. Clinical trials are also very expensive, since researchers must enroll,
treat, and monitor many patients to achieve statistically significant results
when small differences in efficacy are at issue.67
Moreover, the design of clinical trials is beset by a paradox that con-
stricts their clinical relevance. To be good science-that is, to give "clean"
-therapeutic answers and to minimize confounding influences on clinical
outcomes-their inclusion criteria must be narrow: the experimental and
control groups must be relatively homogeneous with respect to multiple
demographic and pathophysiological characteristics.68 Such factors as age,
gender, race and ethnicity, environmental exposure, and personal and fam-
ily histories of particular illnesses are often grounds for exclusion from
prospective trials. In addition, the outcome variables to be monitored and
assessed must be susceptible to objective (that is, statistically reliable)
measurement and must be few and simple enough to make the research
manageable. A well-designed prospective trial is therefore likely to assess
only a small number of the many effects of a course of treatment upon a
person's life.
Indeed, there is a roughly inverse relationship between the quality of
clinical trials as science and the scope of their real-world relevance. Appli-
cation of their findings to patients and to situations falling outside their
narrow inclusion criteria requires a leap of nonscientific inference. Physio-
logical differences between such patients and a clinical trial's homogene-
ous subjects may have large effects on clinical outcomes. And to the extent
that outcomes other than those monitored in a clinical trial are deemed im-
portant in practice, the relevance of a trial's findings may be limited even
for patients who match the inclusion criteria. For example, a trial that dis-
cerns small differences in survival time between two cancer treatments
may be of marginal import for a patient who is concerned primarily about
her level of functioning or quality of life.
These limitations have inspired enthusiasm for large-scale, retrospec-
tive review of clinical data. Data from clinical practice is becoming acces-
sible to researchers on an unprecedented scale, thanks to the enormous
electronic databases of managed health plans,69 and retrospective study of
these databases is a promising avenue. Yet such research presents daunting
problems, arising from the complexity and subtlety of clinical observation.
The recording of bits and pieces of clinical information by busy
67. See GORDIS, supra note 65, at 98-100.
68. Id.
69. See David B. Kendall & S. Robert Levine, Pursuing the Promise of an Information-Age
Health Care System, HEALTH AFF., Nov.-Dec. 1998, at 41; J.D. Kleinke, Release 0.0: Clinical
Information Technology in the Real World, HEALTH AFF., Nov.-Dec. 1998, at 23.
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practitioners, concerned variously about utilization review,7" billing, liabil-
ity risk, and communicating with colleagues about management of cases,
produces spotty, inconsistent records. These limitations make identification
of groups of similar patients, for the purpose of comparing alternative di-
agnostic or treatment measures, quite problematic. Case-by-case variations
in both record keeping and clinical management make it equally problem-
atic to identify and track, for purposes of comparison, discrete diagnostic
and therapeutic approaches, and to systematically study retrospectively
chosen outcome measures.
Other outcomes research methods present analogous difficulties, tied
to the complexity and subtlety of clinical measurement.7' Such research
promises to improve the scientific quality of clinical decision making and
is worthy of public investment.72 Yet a comprehensive science of clinical
outcomes and a comprehensive empirical basis for medical practice remain
far beyond our reach. Absent such an empirical foundation, no agreed-upon
set of cost-benefit trade-off principles can yield a comprehensive set of
clinical-practice protocols to guide medical spending decisions. The result-
ing indeterminacy leaves room for wide variation in clinical practice-and
thus for ongoing conflict over such legal and regulatory matters as deter-
mination of medical necessity by health plans, reasonable care in medical
tort law, and the scope of Medicare and Medicaid coverage. Beyond this, it
presents a large obstacle to systemically rational, population-wide alloca-
tion of limited clinical resources, whether by contractually authorized or
regulatory means.
D. Valuing the Benefits of Medical Care
Were a comprehensive science of clinical outcomes on the horizon,
complete with reliable data on the efficacy of most medical interventions in
70. See M. Gregg Bloche, Fidelity and Deceit at the Bedside, 283 JAMA 1881 (2000); Matthew
K. Wynia et al., Physician Manipulation of Reimbursement Rules for Patients: Between a Rock and a
Hard Place, 283 JAMA 1858 (2000) (reporting and analyzing evidence that physicians engage on a
large scale in deceptive recording of clinical information for the purpose of qualifying for insurance
coverage).
71. Observational case-control studies, for example, have been urged as a cheaper, less ethically
problematic approach than the randomized clinical trial for the evaluation of widely used treatments
that have never been empirically validated. See Ralph 1. Horwitz & Alvan R. Feinstein, Improved
Observational Method for Studying Therapeutic Efficacy: Suggestive Evidence that Lidocaine
Prophylaxis Prevents Death in Acute Myocardial Infarction, 246 JAMA 2455 (1981). This strategy,
which, like randomized prospective trials, requires development of inclusion criteria to produce
homogeneous patient groups for comparative study, involves systematic monitoring of patients who
receive different treatments from their own, nonresearch physicians.
72. Published clinical-outcomes research, like most scientific research, is a classic "public good"
in the economic sense. Private actors (for example, managed health plans) that support it cannot capture
all its social benefits and can therefore be expected to underinvest in it; thus public support for it (for
example, by the Agency for Health Care Research and Quality and the National Institutes of Health) is
desirable.
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most clinical circumstances, the challenge of valuing actual and expected
medical outcomes would still render systemic welfare maximization deeply
problematic as a policy and legal goal. This challenge has inspired a range
of approaches, virtually all of which look in some manner toward sub-
scriber, patient, or citizen preferences. About all that these approaches have
in common is their clear rejection of old-fashioned, 1950s paternalism, the
notion that doctors know best about the desirability of particular clinical
outcomes. Aside from this, they differ fundamentally in their treatment of
questions that underlie much of the current ethical and legal debate over
patients' rights and responsibilities.
1. The Informed-Consent Paradigm
These differences in approach are tied to the varying ways by which
one can assay preferences. The classic informed-consent model largely
defers to patients' individual, subjective preferences at the moment of
medical decision, after their physicians have advised them about clinical
risks, benefits, and alternatives. To be sure, informed-consent law places
some limits on patients' subjective judgment. These constraints operate
mainly through standards for assessing the sufficiency of physician disclo-
sure. Most U.S. jurisdictions require physicians to reveal what a reasonable
practitioner would disclose (that is, to adhere to a professionally defined
standard).73 Others mandate disclosure of all that a reasonable patient
would find material to her decision.74 Some critics dismiss both approaches
as insufficiently deferential to individuals' bedside preferences. Instead,
they urge a subjective-disclosure standard, tailored to the psychological
make up of each patient.75 The requirement of competence to give consent
also limits the law's deference to individuals' subjective preferences. Pa-
tient preferences that health professionals believe are unreasonable can
trigger psychological examinations and findings of incompetence when
signs of reason-distorting mental illness are present.
The classic informed-consent paradigm presumes the sovereignty of
patients' preferences, variously assessed, when clinical needs arise. It dis-
regards the influence of insurance coverage, and of economic incentives
and pressures more generally,76 on sick patients' choices.77 Despite
73. See, e.g., Riedisser v. Nelson, 534 P.2d 1052, 1054 (Ariz. 1975); Gorab v. Zook, 943 P.2d
423, 427-28 (Colo. 1997); Natanson v. Kline, 350 P.2d 1093, 1106 (Kan. 1960); McPhee v. Bay City
Samaritan Hosp., 159 N.W.2d 880, 882 (Mich. Ct. App. 1968); Butler v. Berkeley, 213 S.E.2d 571,
580, 582 (N.C. Ct. App. 1975).
74. See Cobbs v. Grant, 502 P.2d 1, 11 (Cal. 1972); Logan v. Greenwich Hosp. Ass'n, 465 A.2d
294, 299-301 (Conn. 1983); Carr v. Strode, 904 P.2d 489, 500 (Haw. 1995).
75. See Jay Katz, Informed Consent-Must It Remain a Fairy Tale?, 10 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L.
& POL'Y 69 (1994).
76. See M. Gregg Bloche, Clinical Counseling and the Problem ofAutonomy-Negating Influence,
in HIV, AIDS & CHILDBEARING: PUBLIC POLICY, PRIVATE LIVES 257-319 (Ruth R. Faden & Nancy E.
Kass eds., 1996).
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criticism from adherents to the standard story of waste in health care provi-
sion,78 the informed-consent paradigm remains governing law throughout
the United States. However, the criticism is gaining attention.
2. Informed Consent Reconceived: The Ex Ante Approach
The proposition that insurance coverage delegitimates the sovereignty
of sick patients' clinical preferences has taken on the status of assumed
wisdom for many health-policy commentators.79 The ex ante perspective,
the vantage point of consumers visiting the employee-benefits office to
select a health plan, is, for these commentators, the preferred locus for
binding health care choices. The employee-benefits office has become
health care financing's Rawlsian "original position"-a place for subse-
quently binding choices that draw their moral legitimacy from each
chooser's ignorance about what biological time and chance hold in store.
The ex ante approach abates the problem of moral hazard by con-
straining the chooser after time and chance have dealt their fate. It aspires,
instead, toward a new kind of empowerment-the authority to impose fu-
ture limits on oneself through a binding contract with a health plan that
conserves collective resources by limiting sick people's options. Some
proponents of universal, government-provided medical coverage urge an
analogue to this approach. They suggest that we can give ex ante consent
collectively, through political processes, to constraints on sick peoples'
choices imposed by statute or by regulation, as part of a public medical-
insurance scheme.8" Another analogue, in the private sector, applies to con-
sumers whose employers offer only one or a few coverage options, se-
verely limiting the scope of ex ante choice. In this scenario, the employers
act as medical purchasing agents for their employees, selecting from a wide
range of coverage options and thereby making ex ante commitments on
their employees' behalf.8
Detailed consideration of these ex ante models' problematic treatment
of the ideal of personal choice is beyond the scope of this Article. Instead, I
77. See Susan M. Wolf, Toward a Systemic Theory of Informed Consent in Managed Care, 35
Hous. L. REv. 1631 (1999).
78. See EPSTEIN, supra note 28, at 300-06, 346 (objecting to allowing sick, insured patients to
make unbridled claims on insurance risk pools).
79. E.g., Mark A. Hall & Gerald F. Anderson, Health Insurers' Assessment of Medical Necessity,
140 U. PA. L. REV. 1637 (1992); PAUL T. MENZEL, STRONG MEDICINE: THE ETHICAL RATIONING OF
HEALTH CARE (1990).
80. Michael J. Garland, Rationing in Public: Oregon s Priority-Setting Methodology, in
RATIONING AMERICA'S MEDICAL CARE: THE OREGON PLAN AND BEYOND 37, 37 (Martin A. Strosberg
et al. eds., 1992).
81. This analogue finds some support in the limited fiduciary duties ERISA imposes on
employee-welfare benefit plans. See, e.g., Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 506 (1996). It is
plausible in economic terms to the extent that labor-market pressures (and the tax environment) give
employers incentives to offer attractive fringe-benefit packages that incorporate balances employees
would strike between receipt of wages and benefits.
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focus on the uncertainties these models present for welfare-economics
approaches to health care decision making. First, the general notion that we
should privilege the ex ante perspective has hardly carried the day, legally
or culturally, as the current state of informed-consent doctrine illustrates.
Legal conflict is likely to arise if health insurers try to hold patients to ex
ante commitments to forego therapeutic options arguably preserved by in-
formed-consent law's disclosure requirements or by judicial understand-
ings of "medical necessity."82 One might dismiss such conflict as a mere
transition problem-a by-product of the long half-life of outmoded think-
ing about personal choice when others foot the bill. But the law's reluc-
tance to adopt the ex ante perspective may reflect bona fide moral qualms
about binding people in medical extremis to precommitments they make
casually and unreflectively at best, and unknowingly at worst, when they
visit the employee-benefits office, step into the voting booth, or merely
accept a job.
Second, there are limits to the assumptions of risk and the precom-
mitments we permit. For example, we spend collectively to rescue kayak-
ers or hikers who venture into harm's way in defiance of law or after
signing all manner of waiver. We also provide life-saving surgical care to
young accident victims who could have bought health insurance but failed
to do so. We provide care for a mix of reasons, difficult to disentangle.
These include paternalism; society's squeamishness about the conse-
quences of doing otherwise; and the belief that inadequate information, in
the form of ex ante ignorance about our feelings while drowning, starving,
or bleeding to death, precludes the treatment of such high-stakes risk taking
as binding.
This last belief rests on the premise that our emotional responses en-
rich our understanding of the choices we face. Our emotional reactions to
life's experiences affect our preferences in morally relevant ways, this line
of thinking holds. John Stuart Mill took the position that we should not
regard a person's assent to something as consent to the consequences that
follow from it unless the person has both an emotional and a cognitive ap-
preciation of these consequences.83 Some contemporary utilitarians pay
close attention to links between preference changes and life experience,
arguing for what Jon Elster has termed "respect for the freedom of choice
82. To the consternation of critics who favor the ex ante perspective (and judicial recognition of
multiple market tiers of care), courts have tended to treat "medical necessity" standards in insurance
contracts as warrants for professional (physician) judgment about appropriate treatment, irrespective of
insurers' ex ante resource constraints. See, e.g., Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 122 S. Ct. 2151,
536 U.S. 355 (2002) (characterizing "medical necessity" standards as matters of professional judgment,
not contract interpretation).
83. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 172-73 (Gertrude Himmelfarb ed., Penguin Classics 1974)
(1859).
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of later selves."84 Feminist writers have won growing recognition for the
emotional dimension of human understanding and the incompleteness of
purely cognitive models of knowledge and information.85 Other moral phi-
losophers have recently shown heightened interest in connections between
feelings and evaluative judgments. 6
When we sign up for a health plan, we have at best some vague ideas
about acceptable trade-offs among price, quality, and constraints on choice.
We may particularly dread some medical risks and discount others. How-
ever, we do not and cannot reflect with care about what we would feel and
prefer in the event of each of the vast range of tragic medical possibilities. 7
We are ignorant, both cognitively and affectively, about what biological
time and chance hold in store for us and about how we will feel (and what
our medical preferences will be) when fate shows its hand.
To the extent that this ignorance matters morally, health care financ-
ing's "original position" is not a morally secure redoubt. And to the extent
that we paternalistically question others' medical precommitments, or be-
come squeamish about the nastier consequences of treating them as bind-
ing, our misgivings about this "original position" are magnified. Thus an
unresolved, perhaps unresolvable, tension exists between the appeal of the
ex ante perspective as an answer to insurance's distortion of incentives and
our reluctance to hold patients to it. We are fundamentally ambivalent over
whether it is more "rational" to privilege people's ex ante decisions or to
credit "the freedom of choice of later selves" who possess insurance-
augmented buying power. The law of health care provision embodies this
ambivalence. Litigation over "medical necessity" and myriad coverage ex-
clusions, as well as legislative and regulatory conflict over patients' rights
vis-d-vis health plans, express it.
3. The Indeterminacy of the Ex Ante Approach
Were we to fully embrace the ex ante perspective, in either market-
oriented or political (collective-consent) form, the task of assigning values
to poteritial health outcomes so as to maximize welfare through medical
(and health-law) decision making would remain problematic because of
multiple indeterminacies. In theory, a health plan with a fixed budget set
by annual premiums should strive to maximize the aggregate health value
84. See JON ELSTER, ULYSSES AND THE SIRENS: STUDIES IN RATIONALITY AND IRRATIONALITY
73 (1979).
85. See generally MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, LOVE'S KNOWLEDGE: ESSAYS ON PHILOSOPHY AND
LITERATURE (1990).
86. See generally Justin D'Arms, Empathy and Evaluative Inquiry, 74 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1467
(2000).
87. Our affective capacity to anticipate our future feelings and consequent changes in our
preferences is bounded, no less than is our cognitive capacity to anticipate and plan for future
contingencies. See James G. March, Bounded Rationality, Ambiguity, and the Engineering of Choice, 9
BELL J. ECON. 587 (1978).
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its medical spending produces.88 To do this in practice, a health plan would
need to assign expected values to its universe of clinical interventions, and
then set a threshold expected value-to-cost ratio for coverage of clinical
interventions. Health-plan managers, inventive researchers, and commenta-
tors have proposed many outcome-valuation methods, virtually all tied in
some manner to measurement of consumers' or citizens' health-related
preferences. Surveys, 89 structured interviews, 90 focus groups,91 and com-
munity meetings 92 are among the techniques that have been tried or urged
to assay respondents' ex ante thinking about the values of clinical out-
comes. Commentators have also proposed experimental markets-
presentation of hypothetical trading options to human subjects to generate
comparative valuations of outcomes-and extrapolations from implicit
valuations of life and states of health in labor and consumer-products mar-
kets.93 Joined to an extensive program of medical-outcomes research, such
methods hold out the promise of a comprehensive set of expected values
for clinical interventions.
In theory, "quality adjusted life years" and a variety of other common
metrics make it possible to test a universe of expected value-to-cost ratios
against the plan's threshold for coverage. In practice, multiple difficulties
confound this promise, introducing indeterminacies that invite legal con-
flict. To begin with, although advocates of the ex ante consent paradigm
often analogize to the classic informed consent at the bedside, 94 the out-
come valuation approaches just discussed entail a sharp departure from
informed-consent doctrine's deference to individuals' idiosyncratic, sub-
jective judgments. To be sure, as I noted earlier, the classic informed-
consent doctrine cabins the permissible subjectivity of patients' decisions.
But these outcome-valuation approaches allow no individualized variation
in health plans' resource-allocation protocols based on subscribers'
88. In practice, plan managers' allocative decisions may be affected by other, conflicting
incentives, such as pressures to assuage "squeaky wheel" patients and providers and risk-selection
opportunities that inhere in the administration of benefits. The important problems these incentives
present are beyond my scope here.
89. See Peter A. Ubel, How Stable Are People's Preferences for Giving Priority to Severely Ill
Patients?, 49 Soc. SCl. & MED. 895 (1999); Peter A. Ubel et al., Public Preferences for Prevention
Versus Cure: What If an Ounce of Prevention Is Worth Only an Ounce of Cure?, 18 MED. DECISION
MAKING, Apr.-June 1998, at 141.
90. See, e.g., Oregon Health Decisions, Report of the Making Health Policy 2000 project,
available at http://www.ahd.org/states/or/hd2000.html.
91. See, e.g., Peter A. Ubel, PRICING LIFE: WHY IT'S TIME FOR HEALTH CARE RATIONING 53-54
(1999).
92. See, e.g., Joshua M. Wiener, Rationing in America: Overt and Covert, in RATIONING
AMERICA'S MEDICAL CARE: THE OREGON PLAN AND BEYOND 12, 13 (Martin A. Strosberg et al. eds.,
1992).
93. Frank Ackerman & Lisa Heinzerling, Pricing the Priceless: Cost-Benefit Analysis of
Environmental Protection, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1553, 1558 (2002).
94. See Mark A. Hall, The Problems with Rule-BasedRationing, 19 J. MED. & PHIL. 315 (1994);
Mark A. Hall, Informed Consent to Rationing Decisions, 71 MILBANK Q. 645 (1993).
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idiosyncratic, ex ante health-related anxieties, fears, and wishes.95 These
approaches rest, instead, on population-wide assessments of ex ante prefer-
ences, setting the stage for conflict with the law's traditional deference to
personal idiosyncrasy.
Such conflict is unavoidable because bounded rationality problems
make it impossible for health plans to offer large menus of alternative pro-
tocols, tailored to prospective subscribers' individualized anxieties, fears,
and wishes. To construct a menu of such protocols and to make them
minimally understandable to consumers, a health plan would need to learn
the private, even unconscious anxieties, fears, and wishes of thousands of
prospective subscribers, a task posing an insurmountable problem of
"information impactedness."96 It would then need to translate and catego-
rize this knowledge into alternative sets of allocative principles, general
enough to be understandable to prospective subscribers,97 yet specific
enough to provide meaningful information about alternative sets of detailed
allocative rules. 98
If health plans could accomplish this impossibly complex task, then
implementation of the resulting multiple allocative policies would be un-
achievable. Each health plan would need to develop multiple sets of alloca-
tive rules, covering thousands of clinical scenarios; plan physicians would
need to remember and apply the different allocative rules to clinically simi-
lar patients who made different ex ante allocative commitments. This ap-
proach would require physicians to set aside ethical prohibitions against
making such bedside distinctions between patients.99 Were they willing to
95. At most, health plans may allow subscribers to "buy out" of their allocative protocols-for
example, by paying more out of pocket to access out-of-network providers.
96. See Oliver E. Williamson, Markets and Hierarchies: Some Elementary Considerations, 63
AM. EcON. REV. 316 (1973) (presenting notion of "information impactedness" as a way to characterize
poor accessibility of information to outside observers, including administrators in a bureaucracy); cf
F.A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. EcON. REV. 519 (1945) (contending that
decentralization of knowledge increases efficiency of decision making).
97. Cf Howard Latin, "Good" Warnings, Bad Products, and Cognitive Limitations, 41 UCLA L.
REV. 1193, 1211-15 (1994) (discussing limits on consumers' abilities to understand detailed warnings
regarding hazards posed by consumer products).
98. Mediating sets of allocative principles, much more general and simple than detailed clinical-
practice protocols, would be necessary to achieve consumer comprehension. Asking prospective
subscribers to choose ex ante between alternative, complete sets of allocative protocols, covering
thousands of clinical scenarios, would present an impossible task.
99. It would be Pollyannaish to portray physicians as other than deeply implicated in past and
present discrimination in medical-resource use based on insurance coverage, social class, race and
ethnicity, and gender. See generally M. Gregg Bloche, Race and Discretion in American Medicine, I
YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y L. & ETHICS 95 (2001). Yet even in the most dramatic cases, for example,
overt racial discrimination in apartheid-era South Africa and the pre- I 970s American South, individual
practitioners have tended to abide by single standards of care (subject to externally imposed resource
constraints) and to resist, on ethical grounds, pressures to practice differently on clinically similar
patients. Those who engineered apartheid medicine in South Africa created an administratively
fragmented system within which the individual clinician could devote herself to one standard of care
(for one segment of society) and thereby feel protected from a sense of personal complicity in the
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do so, they would confront insurmountable cognitive limits. The available
evidence indicates that getting physicians to comply with even a single,
comprehensive set of centrally promulgated clinical-practice protocols is
exceedingly difficult.' Physicians' practice patterns are matters of per-
sonal habit, drawn from mentors' expectations, interactions with peers, and
a lifetime of professional experience. Physicians acquire them unreflec-
tively and are resistant to changing them in response to scientific data, let
alone the entreaties of health-plan managers. Evidence suggests that when
physicians change their practice styles to accommodate pressures to
economize on care for only some of their patients, they make similar ad-
justments in the care they give to their other patients, even when doing so
is contrary to their economic interests.' ' Although one might explain this
by hypothesizing that physicians adhere altruistically to an antidiscrimina-
tion principle, it is also consistent with cognitive obstacles to applying dif-
ferent allocative protocols to clinically equivalent patients with differing
insurance coverage. Because physicians' practice styles are more matters
of personal habit than of self-conscious, rational design, they are peculiarly
resistant to managerial reengineering.
4. The Indeterminacy of Efforts to Aggregate Health-Plan Subscribers'
Allocative Preferences
A health plan, therefore, can aspire, at best, toward a single, compre-
hensive set of allocative protocols, perhaps informed by population-wide
methods of valuing states of health and illness and years of life. Yet, even
this more modest goal presents serious obstacles.
The survey, extrapolation, and other techniques discussed earlier
promise to supply the population-wide preference data needed to develop
expected values for clinical interventions and to test expected value-to-cost
ratios against plan thresholds for coverage. However, efforts to aggregate
individuals' preferences into population-wide valuations are notoriously
path dependent. Even if individuals' expressed preferences were invariant
imposition of apartheid. HUMAN RIGHTS AND HEALTH: THE LEGACY OF APARTHEID (Audrey R.
Chapman & Leonard S. Rubenstein eds., 1998) [hereinafter HUMAN RIGHTS AND HEALTH: THE
LEGACY OF APARTHEID].
100. See Michael D. Cabana et al., Why Don't Physicians Follow Clinical Practice Guidelines? A
Framework for Improvement, 282 JAMA 1458 (1999); see also Eisenberg & Schneider, supra note 58.
101. After the Medicare program's shift in 1983 from per diem and fee-for-service payment of
hospitals to prospective payment by diagnosis, which gave hospital administrators powerful incentives
to press physicians for earlier discharges and lower-cost diagnosis and treatment, average hospital stays
(the product of physician decision making) dropped substantially not only for Medicare patients but
also for privately insured, fee-for-service patients. See Judith Feder et al., How Did Medicare's
Prospective Payment System Affect Hospitals?, 317 NEw ENG. J. MED. 867, 870 (1987). This
development defied predictions that the advent of Medicare prospective payment would lead providers
to compensate for lost Medicare revenues by lengthening privately insured patients' hospital stays so as
to collect more from fee-for-service payers.
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and easily discernable, efforts to aggregate them would yield different re-
sults depending on the sequencing of questions asked. °2 Moreover, multi-
ple, well-studied cognitive predispositions0 3 make individuals' answers to
questions about their relative valuation of risks and benefits dependent on
the context and framing of the questions. Unconscious rules of thumb 0 4
incline persons toward evaluative judgments that give special weight to
vivid and recent experiences (the "availability" heuristic), initial impres-
sions (the "anchoring" heuristic), and the idiosyncrasies of each person's
experience more generally (the "representativeness" heuristic). Starting
points (for example, the "endowment effect"0 5), framing biases, and other
influences produce additional, path-dependent variation in persons' ex-
pressed preferences. This variation virtually guarantees that different
methods of valuing states of health and illness will yield divergent results
and differing resource-allocation protocols. To the extent that patients or
providers dissatisfied with allocative results seek administrative or legal
relief, these differences make ongoing conflict over health plans' spending
decisions predictable.
Such conflict is likely to be especially divisive and morally trouble-
some when rules of thumb, starting point effects, and other path-dependent
biases produce allocative protocols begrudging in their treatment of so-
cially disfavored groups. For example, a survey that asks people to value
maintenance treatment for people with chronic schizophrenia might yield
ungenerous results due to starting-point effects. The vast majority of peo-
ple (and those close to them) do not have schizophrenia.0 6 Many people
view it as a dread, incurable condition,0 7 making them likely to see main-
tenance therapy as a low-benefit endeavor, since it cannot ameliorate the
deficits that keep many people with the disease from aspiring to high-
functioning occupational and personal lives.0 8 Personal experience with
102. See KENNETH J. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES 2-3 (2d ed. 1970).
103. A well-known, comprehensive review of this work is JUDGMENT UNDER
UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES (D. Kahneman et al. eds., 1982).
104. See Herbert A. Simon, Rational Choice and the Structure of the Environment, 63 PSYCHOL.
REV. 129 (1956). Cognitive psychologists interpret such rules of thumb as adaptations to humans'
limited information-processing capacities.
105. Jack L. Knetsch, The Endowment Effect and Evidence of Nonreversible Indifference Curves,
79 AM. ECON. REV. 1277 (1989).
106. Epidemiological surveys have found incidence rates of 1% or less for schizophrenia in many
nations and cultures. See The International Pilot Study of Schizophrenia, SCHIZOPHRENIA BULL.,
Winter 1974, at 21.
107. One might conceptualize this perception in terms of the "availability" or "representativeness"
heuristics. For those without personal experience with schizophrenia, media and other popular
stereotypes of homeless and other profoundly dysfunctional people with this disease probably play a
large role in shaping impressions.
108. See D. Dickinson & R.D. Coursey, Independence and Overlap Among Neurocognitive
Correlatives of Community Functioning in Schizophrenia, 56 SCHIZOPHRENIA REG. 161 (2002)
(examining correlations between cognitive and other deficits and levels of community functioning in
patients with schizophrenia).
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schizophrenia might lead to higher regard for maintenance therapy, tied to
appreciation for well-treated patients' enhanced capacities to care for
themselves and socialize with others."9 Another example is valuation of
treatment for diseases widely thought to ensue from reckless or socially
scorned voluntary behavior, such as alcoholic liver cirrhosis and HIV in-
fection."' On the other hand, detailed allocative protocols can protect pa-
tients against recently documented sub rosa and unconscious racial and
gender discrimination in the provision of costly, high-technology treat-
ments.'''
Proponents of various methods of assessing population-wide ex ante
preferences are developing sophisticated responses to the problem of cog-
nitive predispositions. A new line of research seeks to chart the terrain of
cognitive biases and apparent inconsistencies encountered by survey tech-
niques that ask subjects to make hypothetical trade-offs between treatment
for different disease states."2 This work is animated by the hope that de-
signers of resource-allocation protocols can correct for these biases and
inconsistencies when extrapolating from survey results to derive expected
values for medical interventions. But determining which biases and incon-
sistencies merit correction-and how to make such corrections-is hardly
clear cut. Efforts to distinguish between cognitive error and preferences
109. This effect is distinct from adverse selection since it influences ex ante preferences of
individuals independently of their likelihood of someday needing treatment for schizophrenia. For
example, friendship with an afflicted person (or the person's family) might either sensitize one to the
capacity of treatment to enhance well-being and dignity or traumatize one to the point of embittered
rejection of the value of maintenance therapy.
110. The social and moral status of disease-causing behavior may have more influence than such
behavior's perceived voluntariness upon public beliefs about the value of treatment for ensuing illness.
The telephone survey that Oregon employed initially to rank medical conditions and treatments for its
Medicaid rationing program is illustrative: it generated low rankings for treatment of schizophrenia
and liver cirrhosis. See OREGON HEALTH SERVS. COMM., supra note 51. Even after Oregon adjusted its
survey-derived rankings through a process of town meetings and deliberations with medical ethicists,
the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services ruled that the rankings so prejudiced people with
some medical conditions that they violated the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"). The Clinton
Administration revised and eventually authorized the Oregon Plan. See Robert Pear, U.S. Backs
Oregon's Health Plan for Covering All Poor People, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20, 1993, § I, at 8.
Compare attitudes toward cardiac care for Brie-eating, steak-loving, six-figure eamers with
attitudes toward liver transplantation for alcoholic cirrhosis or costly antiviral regimens for HIV-
infected drug users or practitioners of anal sex.
S111. See INST. OF MED. COMM. ON UNDERSTANDING AND ELIMINATING RACIAL AND ETHICAL
DISPARITIES IN HEALTH CARE, UNEQUAL TREATMENT: CONFRONTING RACIAL AND ETHNIC
DISPARITIES IN HEALTH CARE (Brian D. Smedley et al. ed., 2002); see also Bloche, supra note 99.
112. See, e.g., Peter A. Ubel et al., Value Measurement in Cost-Utility Analysis: Explaining the
Discrepancy Between Rating Scale and Person Trade-Off Elicitations, 43 HEALTH POL'Y 33 (1998);
Peter A. Ubel et al., Individual Utilities Are Inconsistent with Rationing Choices: A Partial
Explanation of Why Oregon's Cost-Effectiveness List Failed, 16 MED. DECISION MAKING, Apr.-June
1996, at 117.
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that might merit deference" 3 run afoul of the latent or overt normative
content in myriad cognitive predispositions. Low valuation of maintenance
therapy for schizophrenia is illustrative: it is cognizable either as a misun-
derstanding of the disease or as a value judgment about life with schizo-
phrenia, with and without treatment. Cognitive psychology's heuristics
based on the availability and representativeness of information, as well as
the anchoring effect of first impressions, model the sort of thinking, based
on stereotypes, that leads many to place little value on treatment for
schizophrenia. But the notion of cognitive heuristics does not distinguish
between logical error and normative bias, let alone between bias that does
and bias that does not merit legal or social acceptance. Whether mainte-
nance treatment for schizophrenia should be valued less or more highly
than, say, clinical management of lupus, asthma, or other chronic illnesses
is a moral and political question, beyond the reach of cognitive-psychology
research.
Apparent cognitive inconsistencies present similar normative issues.
Consider a survey that presents a hypothetical trade-off between equally
costly and effective life-saving treatment for people with and without some
disabling condition, say quadriplegia. Suppose that survey respondents at-
tach equal value to providing this treatment to able-bodied and quadriple-
gic patients but that, in answering another survey question, the respondents
place a high value on intervention that restores some quadriplegic people to
able-bodied status. One might read this as a logical inconsistency. If re-
spondents equally value saving the lives of the able-bodied and the quadri-
plegic, should they not see restoration of function to quadriplegic people as
having no value?".4 Or, if respondents highly value restorative therapy, do
they not see life with quadriplegia as less desirable than able-bodied life
and life-saving treatment as therefore less valuable for those with quadri-
plegia than for the able-bodied?
Extrapolation from hypothetical trade-offs in pursuit of a comprehen-
sive scheme of expected values requires resolution of such seeming incon-
sistencies. Identification and correction of cognitive errors promise to
accomplish this resolution but require answers to normative questions.
What is the error-respondents' attachment of value to restorative therapy
for people with quadriplegia or their equal valuation of life-saving treat-
ment for the quadriplegic and the able-bodied? Or is this apparent
113. See Richard H. Pildes & Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatory State, 62 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1, 61-62 (1995) (arguing for recognition of distinctions between errors in risk perception and
different valuations of the same "objective" risk).
114. Indeed, some object to restorative therapies (for example, intervention to enable deaf people
to hear) on precisely these grounds, arguing that attaching positive value to such therapies devalues
disabled people's lives. Harlan Lane & Michael Grodin, Ethical Issues in Cochlear Implant
Surgery: An Exploration into Disease, Disability, and the Best Interests of the Child, 7 KENNEDY INST.
ETHCS J. 231 (1997).
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inconsistency understandable in terms of the respondents' moral commit-
ments? Perhaps respondents who assign equal value to saving the lives of
the quadriplegic and able-bodied patients, but who attach a high value to
ameliorating quadriplegia, are adhering to a concept of formal equality,
regardless of disability, for life-saving purposes. Perhaps they, at the same
time, think it is better to be cured of quadriplegia than to be fated to it, but
they treat this disability as morally irrelevant to decisions about life sav-
ing.'15 What seems on the surface like a logical inconsistency may have a
deeper philosophic justification.
Attempts to correct for such inconsistencies and for cognitive predis-
positions thus necessarily entail the substitution of some moral preferences
for others. "Prejudice" in the valuation of medical interventions based on
population-wide ex ante preferences is unavoidable, since people's ex ante
preferences are almost always prejudgments-beliefs formed without per-
sonal experience of the disease states in question. To the extent that the
moral preferences at issue are socially controverted, resource-allocation
protocols derived from them will be open to political, administrative, or
legal challenges by those who lose out. The prolonged controversy in
Oregon over Medicaid rationing priorities illustrates the potential for para-
lytic conflict over moral choices underlying relative valuations of clinical
benefits.
To summarize, welfare-maximizing resource use within a health sys-
tem, through equalization of the marginal benefits of medical spending,
requires agreement on how to value the benefits of medical care. Such
agreement is not in sight. A broad social and legal consensus supports the
general idea that we should value the benefits of health care by looking to
consumer preferences. Beyond this, agreement breaks down. The classic
informed-consent model, still relied upon by courts and supported in vari-
ous forms by commentators, defers to patients' health care choices at the
moment of medical decision and disregards the influence of insurance cov-
erage. Ex ante approaches try to take account of this influence by looking
to consumers' expressed or imputed valuations of health care prior to the
onset of clinical need. In its different guises, the consent model imputes
value to clinical interventions in many ways, with varying results, all
linked at least tenuously to expressed preferences. Potent moral arguments
can be marshaled for and against these many alternative approaches to
valuing medical care's benefits. Because these arguments express contra-
dictory moral commitments deeply rooted in our society and culture, their
resolution is not on the horizon. Measurement of medical care's benefits is
thus deeply problematic. When valuation issues reach regulators, the
115. Such thinking infuses our everyday morality. For example, we expect firefighters to make
equal efforts to rescue rich and poor people from burning buildings, even though we tend to think it is
better to be rich than to be poor. The ADA's legal safeguards for the disabled embody such thinking.
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courts, or other dispute management institutions, incoherent results are in-
evitable. The ensuing unpredictability increases the likelihood of frequent,
protracted conflict. These valuation problems are additional reason to
doubt that the welfare-maximization principle can usefully channel the de-
velopment of health law.
E. Making Systemwide Cost-Benefit Trade-Offs
The challenge of employing clinical resources in systematic fashion,
to maximize the medical benefits that every dollar buys, requires a sys-
temwide, threshold benefit-cost trade-off ratio, set to match the available
resources. A health care system, in theory, should supply only services
with anticipated benefit-cost ratios above this threshold. This threshold is
typically represented visually in the health-care-financing literature as a
tangent to a curve drawn concave-downward to express the decreasing
marginal benefits of additional medical spending.
FIGURE 2
Threshold Benefit-
Cost Ratio for
Coverage of Services
Health
Benefits "Flat-of-the-Curve"
Medical Care
Cost (Medical Care Inputs)
Some adherents to the welfare-maximization principle envision implement-
ing this threshold through a comprehensive set of allocative protocols, in-
formed by medical outcomes data, clinical costs, and methodologies for
valuing years of life and states of health. I have already addressed the diffi-
culties presented by uncertainty and indeterminacy about clinical costs and
outcomes, as well as valuation of life and health. I turn now to the
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unworkability of the single, programwide benefit-cost trade-off threshold
as an allocative precept for health systems and for the law.
This allocative precept for medical care is consistent with larger
trends in environmental and other health-related law and regulatory policy.
The notion that policymakers should aspire toward systemwide equaliza-
tion of cost-benefit trade-off triggers for regulatory intervention in health-
related matters has become standard wisdom well beyond the health care
policy sphere. The last four U.S. presidents issued or abided by executive
orders requiring comparative cost-benefit assessments of proposed health
and safety regulations with an eye toward developing a coordinated inter-
agency approach to cost-benefit trade-offs." 6 Regulatory-reform advocates
commonly make consistency in the treatment of costs and benefits the
touchstone for their policy proposals and their criticisms of current ap-
proaches. Gross discrepancies, whether actual or purported,"7 in costs per
life saved between different federal regulations are often cited to support
reform proposals designed to make health and safety regulation more sys-
temically rational." 8
This standard wisdom is at odds with how we actually think about
risks and costs in different contexts. A dissenting line of commentary on
environmental regulation points to cognitive predispositions and inconsis-
tencies of the sort discussed above as proof that people make different
choices about hazardous alternatives than conventional risk analysis-
grounded in expected-utility theory-would predict or prefer. This com-
mentary interprets discrepancies between people's choices and the results
of conventional risk analysis as expressions of people's valuations of risks
and benefits. It departs from the standard wisdom principally by contend-
ing that these discrepancies should be treated as indicators of legitimate
popular preferences and morals, not cognitive errors in need of correc-
tion.' 19
Earlier, I discussed the difficulties that people's cognitive predisposi-
tions and inconsistencies pose for health systems' efforts to assign values
116. Exec. Order No. 13,193, 66 Fed. Reg. 7,387 (Jan. 18, 2001); Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed.
Reg. 51,735 (Sept. 30, 1993); Exec. Order No. 12,291, 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193 (Feb. 17, 1981); Exec.
Order No. 12,044, 3 C.F.R. 152 (1978).
117. See John F. Morrall III, A Review of the Record, REGULATION, Nov.-Dec. 1986, at 25. But
see Lisa Heinzerling, Regulatory Costs of Mythic Proportions, 107 YALE L.J. 1981 (1998) (raising
doubts about Morrall's costs-per-life-saved estimates).
118. E.g., STEPHEN G. BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE: TOWARD EFFECTIVE RISK
REGULATION (1993). Such proposals include: a national regulatory "budget" designed to focus
political attention on the social costs of regulation and to encourage regulators to economize; reliance
on interagency cadres of interdisciplinary experts (skilled at economic reasoning and knowledgeable
about health and environmental risk) to make regulatory policy; and congressional rewriting or creative
judicial reinterpretation of statutes (for example, the Delaney Clause, requiring zero cancer risk for
food additives) that impose prohibitions without regard for countervailing costs.
119. See Donald T. Hornstein, Reclaiming Environmental Law: A Normative Critique of
Comparative Risk Analysis, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 562, 604-16 (1992).
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to the benefits of medical interventions. But the distinction between valua-
tion of benefits and formulation of cost-benefit trade-off rules is largely a
matter of labeling. The data that formed the basis for cognitive psycholo-
gists' modeling of heuristics, framing biases, and the like were drawn from
experimental subjects' choices in trade-off scenarios. We can characterize
these choices in either of two ways-as expressions of the weights people
ascribe to particular costs and benefits or as applications of people's cost-
benefit trade-off rules. The choice between these characterizations has
practical importance. The former characterization treats people's cognitive
biases and inconsistencies as influences on people's valuations of the costs
and benefits at issue. This characterization leaves open the possibility of a
single, systemwide cost-benefit trade-off rule. Once we decide whether
cognitive biases and inconsistencies represent errors of logic, requiring
correction, or people's preferences or moral beliefs, deserving of respect,
we can then, in theory, apply a single cost-benefit trade-off principle sys-
temwide.
By contrast, treatment of people's choices-and their cognitive biases
and inconsistencies-as irrational cost-benefit trade-off behavior casts
doubt on whether systemwide cost-benefit trade-off rules are manageable
in practice. It is one thing to specify a cost-benefit trade-off rule in the nu-
merical abstract, in terms of dollar value for a quality-adjusted life-year, or
some similar measure, and another thing to gain social and legal accep-
tance for such a rule. If cognitive biases and inconsistencies incline either
lay people or experts toward trade-off judgments inconsistent with each
other and at odds with any one across-the-board trade-off rule, then they
set the stage for social and legal conflict over the formulation and imposi-
tion of such rules.
The wide variety of inconsistent cost-benefit balances struck by cur-
rent medical practice suggests a high potential for such conflict. As is often
noted, the enormous costs, per life-year saved, for some intensive-care-unit
services and types of organ transplantation 2 ' contrast sharply with low to
moderate costs per life-year saved for many primary care and screening
services. On a society-wide scale, the marginal benefits, in life-years saved,
of money spent on medical care in general are almost surely much less than
they are for equivalent spending on effective public health,' 2'
120. See Meg Durbin, Bone Marrow Transplantation: Economic, Ethical and Social Issues, 82
PEDIATRICS 774 (1988); Tammy 0. Tengs et al., Five-Hundred Life-Saving Interventions and Their
Cost-Effectiveness, 15 RISK ANALYSIS 369, 371 (1995).
121. See Karla Kerlikowske et al., Continuing Screening Mammography in Women Aged 70 to 79
Years: Impact on Life Expectancy and Cost-Effectiveness, 282 JAMA 2156 (1999); Matthias Schrappe
& Karl Lauterbach, Systematic Review on the Cost-Effectiveness of Public Health Interventions for HIV
Prevention in Industrialized Countries, 12 AIDS 231 (Supp. A,1998); cf Milton C. Weinstein et al.,
Recommendations of the Panel on Cost-Effectiveness in Health and Medicine, 276 JAMA 1253 (1996).
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environmental, 122 and economic development 123 programs. Evidence from
comparative studies supports the conclusion that per capita income, educa-
tion, and other measures of socio-economic well-being influence the health
status of populations to a much greater extent than does per capita spending
on medical care.
124
Were we to take seriously the ideal of society-wide rationalization of
health-related spending through equalization of cost-benefit triggers for
action, we would need to think seriously about shutting down much of
what acute-care medical centers do. Were we to take seriously the less-
sweeping goal of rationalizing medical spending alone along these lines,
we would need to contemplate an enormous shift of resources from high-
technology, crisis-oriented care to less-intensive health promotion, disease-
prevention, and crisis-avoidance services. Little evidence suggests that any
Western, industrialized society is prepared to do these things, through ei-
ther political or market mechanisms. 1
25
Certainly, the wide gap between current health-related spending pat-
terns and the requisites for reallocation of this spending from a welfare-
maximization perspective merit deeper scrutiny. Cognitive psychology ac-
counts of bias and inconsistency explain much in retrospect, in seemingly
objective fashion, but their ad hoc, after-the-fact use 126 is undisciplined by
the rigor of experimental method. Emotional and interpersonal factors such
as differing degrees of dread, family and social ties, perceived voluntari-
ness of risk exposure, and perceived culpability of others for harm127 offer
enriched understanding of health spending patterns, subject to the same ad
hoc problem. Cultural factors may make a difference. For example, the
more individualistic a society's values, the less inclined it may be toward
systemic approaches to resource allocation. Least studied have been the
individualized symbolic meanings, conscious and unconscious, of illness,
diagnosis, and therapy.
128
122. See Kenneth J. Arrow et al., Is There a Role for Cost-Benefit Analysis in Environmental,
Health, and Safety Regulation?, 272 SCIENCE 221 (1996).
123. See Paul Clements, A Poverty-Oriented Cost-Benefit Approach to the Analysis of
Development Projects, 23 WORLD DEV. 577 (1995).
124. See RICHARD WILKINSON, UNHEALTHY SOCIETIES: THE AFFLICTIONS OF INEQUALITY 66-68
(1996).
125. A dramatic counterexample is postapartheid South Africa, where the health ministry and
members of parliament are pushing for wholesale redirection of resources from the nation's elite,
publicly funded tertiary-care centers to community health centers and health-promotion programs in
impoverished townships and rural areas. HUMAN RIGHTS AND HEALTH: THE LEGACY OF APARTHEID,
supra note 99.
126. David M. Kreps, Bounded Rationality, in The NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS
AND LAW 168, 170 (P. Newman ed., 1998).
127. M. Gregg Bloche & Carol Eisenberg, The Psychological Effects of State-Sanctioned Terror,
HARV. MENTAL HEALTH NEWSLETTER, Nov. 1993, at 40.
128. The role of these symbolic meanings in people's medical decisions can be studied in rich
detail through psychodynamic exploration of connections between individuals' fears, anxieties, and
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An enriched appreciation of what people want (and fear) from the
medical system and from health-related public policy more generally
would not only contribute to our understanding of the divergence between
actual health-related spending and its rationalization from a welfare-
maximizing perspective; it could also reduce this gap in two complemen-
tary ways. First, it could enable welfare-economics analysis to take better
account of what people want from health spending beyond objectively
measurable improvement in biological functioning. Such intangibles as
fidelity of clinical caretakers, 129 equity in the distribution of risks and bene-
fits, responsiveness to fears and anxieties evoked by illness and treatment,
and symbolic affirmation of the pricelessness of persons through high-
cost-low-yield rescue measures for patients in dire straits are not typically
incorporated in cost-benefit analysis of health services. Second, it could
help consumers and voters clarify what they want from health services and
how much they are willing to pay for it. Such clarification could reduce
consumer willingness to pay large sums for access to technology-intensive
treatments that provide symbolic reassurance or other psychological satis-
faction but make little tangible difference in health status. This might push
public thinking toward the welfare-maximizing perspective of health
economists and others who emphasize measurable improvement in bio-
logical functioning.
For the foreseeable future, however, the large gap between aspirations
for systemically rational health-related resource use and actual health-
spending patterns will remain with us. Any effort to impose a single bene-
fit-cost trade-off threshold for action-applicable to health-related pro-
grams in general or to medical care alone-would fly in the face of public
and private norms that admit huge differences between the ratios of tangi-
ble health benefits to costs necessary to trigger action in different realms.
For the time being, we can aspire at best to spheres of rationality-
consistency in cost-benefit thinking within, but not across, different realms
of activity. We might reasonably hope, for example, for consistency in
the cost-benefit judgments that underlie choices between last-ditch,
hopes, and their thinking about disease states and diagnostic and therapeutic options. Psychodynamic
inquiry builds on the paradigm of intimate, mostly unconscious linkage between people's elemental
fears, anxieties, and hopes and their understandings of life circumstances and choices. See generally
Roy Schaffer, THE ANALYTIC ATTITUDE (1983). Decisions that seem irrational from the expected-
utility perspective become understandable as responses to mostly unconscious perceptions of threat or
possibility. The richness of this kind of inquiry-the "thick description" it demands and the interpretive
depth it entails-is also its greatest limitation. It is individualized, highly subjective, and inherently
after-the-fact and ad hoc. It is thus a poor tool for predictive modeling of population-wide deviations
from expected-utility thinking.
129. See M. Gregg Bloche, Trust and Betrayal in the Medical Marketplace, 55 STAN. L. REV. 919
(2002) [hereinafter Bloche, Trust and Betrayal in the Medical Marketplace]; M. Gregg Bloche, Clinical
Loyalties and the Social Purposes of Medicine, 281 JAMA 268 (1999) (discussing strains on clinical
caretakers' loyalty to patients) [hereinafter Bloche, Clinical Loyalties and the Social Purposes of
Medicine].
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life-sustaining measures in cardiac intensive care units. But consistency in
the cost-benefit balances struck by intensive care unit physicians, pediatri-
cians who provide well-baby care, and authors of air-pollution regulations
is at odds with the human propensity to compartmentalize treatment of
risks and costs in different spheres of life. Government initiatives to man-
date such consistency across diverse spheres of life would almost certainly
meet strong popular opposition.'30
Recognition of spheres of rationality would substitute for systemic
welfare maximization a "federalist" model for the management of health
risks and benefits in different substantive domains. It would leave room for
health-plan managers, environmental regulators, and other decision makers
to strike very different balances in different realms. Such differences them-
selves add a dynamic element to the model, by creating opportunities for
advocates of reform to point to inconsistencies as evidence of unfairness,
injustice, or waste. Effective advocacy along such lines can change not
only the cost-benefit balances society strikes but also the boundaries soci-
ety implicitly recognizes between domains of activity in which consistency
is sought. These boundaries themselves have moral content, and they will
surely shift with time. But we should not mistake such shifts for movement
toward society-wide economic rationalization of health-related resource
use. Systemwide cost-benefit trade-off triggers for health care provision, in
particular, are beyond our practical and moral reach. 3'
II
LEGAL CONFLICT AND THE QUEST FOR EFFICIENCY
Welfare-economics reasoning has made large inroads into the law of
health care provision. Courts rely upon it when interpreting tort and con-
tract rules. Legislators and administrative agencies invoke efficiency as a
rationale for regulatory interventions. 132 But to the extent that what is
130. Cf Hornstein, supra note 119, at 611-16 (predicting public opposition to efforts to
systematize the making of cost-benefit trade-offs for purposes of environmental regulation).
131. From a utilitarian perspective, one might prefer such systemic triggers; I do not mean here to
contest their desirability in the abstract. My intent here is to be pragmatic. For the reasons discussed in
the text, I am of the view that we are not capable as individuals-and as a democratic society-of the
degree of systemic rationality such triggers demand. This incapability is cognitive, affective, and moral.
Our bounded rationality and emotional engagement with particular people and experiences preclude the
requisite systemwide perspective and judgment. More speculatively, the influence of our particularized
emotional engagements upon our moral judgment may restrain us from systemic thinking run amok and
thereby bestow evolutionary advantage and moral benefits. Pol Pot and Mao thought systematically,
without restraint. Cf RICHARD RORTY, CONTINGENCY, IRONY, AND SOLIDARITY (1989) (reconceiving
liberalism as a solidarity-driven commitment to avoiding cruelty).
132. 1 refer here to the declared goals of regulatory programs and do not mean to deny that
regulatory statutes and agencies are often disproportionately responsive to the concerns of politically
potent interest groups. Also, regulatory programs sometimes subordinate systemic rationality to
redistributive concerns. In addition, more often than they acknowledge, regulators pursue conceptions
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efficient or welfare maximizing is uncertain and contested in the health
sphere, legal decision makers cannot employ economic reasoning to yield
predictable, coherent answers to the questions they confront.
Indeterminacy about what maximizes welfare pervades medical prac-
tice and health care policy. This indeterminacy is both empirical and nor-
mative. It arises from our scientific uncertainty, our limited cognitive
capacities, and our collective indecision about the answers to myriad moral
questions. It furnishes many opportunities for parties with conflicting goals
and interests to contest the question of what efficiency requires. Legal au-
thorities can impose answers in particular cases. But so long as underlying
empirical uncertainties and normative differences linger, these answers will
be open to challenge. Furthermore, the answers that judges and regulators
decree are inconsistent across jurisdictions and incoherent across substan-
tive areas of the law.'33 This incoherence and inconsistency is hardly sur-
prising, given the breadth of empirical and normative indeterminacy in the
health sphere.
Legal inconsistency and incoherence are not unique to health care.134
Yet the health sphere is virtually unique in its multiplicity of legal and
regulatory actors-federal, state, and local; and judicial, administrative,
and legislative-each with its own incomplete understandings and paro-
chial aims.'35 No single public entity, akin to the Environmental Protection
Agency or the Federal Communications Commission, exercises sweeping
regulatory authority. 3 6 Indeterminacy-and ensuing possibilities for incon-
sistency and incoherence in matters of governance-increases exponen-
tially with complexity and the multiplicity of actors in political and social
of systemic rationality that make sense only if we paternalistically interpret the interests of some
affected individuals.
133. Clark C. Havighurst, American Health Care and the Law: We Need to Talk, HEALTH AFF.,
July-Aug. 2000, at 84.
134. "Critical Legal Studies" scholars have for a generation played leading roles in illuminating
inconsistencies and incoherence in many areas of law. See, e.g., MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL
LEGAL STUDIES (1987). Some scholars from both within and outside the Critical Legal Studies
movement suggest that the quest for systemic rationality in public policy is inspired by our emotional
need for a sense of control, more than by real prospects for success. See Donald C. Langevoort,
Behavioral Theories of Judgment and Decision Making in Legal Scholarship: A Literature Review, 51
VAND. L. REV. 1499, 1504 (1998).
135. Havighurst, supra note 133.
136. One might argue in response that I am merely making the case for why there ought to be such
a health-policy agency, to empower us to come closer to achieving systemic rationality. A full response
is beyond my scope here, but I strongly suspect that the passion and energy behind our parochial
concerns and partial understandings in the health sphere preclude the formation and effective
functioning of such an agency. The American history of repeated failed attempts at systematized
regulatory governance of medicine, most recently the Clinton administration's health care reform
proposal, is consistent with this suspicion. On the more mundane level, my frame of reference for this
Article is the array of governance institutions as it (more or less) currently exists, not as it might
someday be radically transformed.
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systems.'3 7 The multiplicity of legal institutions affecting health care is, in
turn, layered on top of the biological and psychological complexities I have
discussed. Thus, whatever the obstacles that human cognitive limitations
and institutional complexity pose for systemic legal governance more gen-
erally, these obstacles are much greater in the health sphere than in other
policy areas.
To suggest the breadth of the legal challenge posed by this indetermi-
nacy and the magnitude of the resulting instability and incoherence in
health law, I will highlight the role of ideas about efficiency in a number of
areas of law bearing on the duties and rights of doctors and hospitals, pay-
ers, and patients. I will not try to review or even to summarize these areas
of law. To do so would require a treatise. Rather, I will focus on the wel-
fare maximization principle's inability to yield clear, coherent, and stable
answers to contested questions within several areas-medical tort law, dis-
putes over medical coverage, legal safeguards for medical professionalism,
health care antitrust law, and regulation of capital investment.
A. Medical Tort Law
As first-year law students quickly learn, the law of negligence in-
structs persons (and organizations) to take "reasonable care." Whether or
not, as Chicagoan law-and-economics scholars have famously argued,
courts have long treated this duty as a call to take precautions when bene-
fits outweigh costs, reasonableness in negligence law is today almost uni-
versally understood in these utilitarian terms. Thus the question of what is
rational in the cost-benefit balancing sense is at the heart of tort law's
treatment of medical decision and action. Clinical judgments and interven-
tions that yield probabilistic benefits in excess of financial and health costs
are appropriate, indeed required, under the reasonable-care standard. Medi-
cal action (and inaction) that fails this test should, in theory, lead to liabil-
ity for any harm that results.
As it does in other technically complex fields, tort law finesses the
problem of determining what constitutes reasonable care in the medical
sphere by looking to industry practice and to experts-the medical profes-
sion-to specify standards of care in particular cases.'38 The utilitarian case
for such deference rests on standard free-market assumptions, including the
sovereignty of revealed preferences as measures of benefit. In an ade-
quately functioning market, industry practice strikes an acceptable balance
between producers' costs and consumers' benefits, and the law looks to
137. Indeterminacy increases exponentially with complexity in physical and biological systems as
well, to the point that meaningful prediction, which requires artful simplification of situations involving
multiple interactions, becomes impossible. RICHARD C. LEWONTIN, THE TRIPLE HELIX: GENE,
ORGANISM, AND ENVIRONMENT 82-87 (2000).
138. See William Schwartz & Neil Komesar, Doctors, Damages and Deterrence: An Economic
View of Medical Malpractice, 298 NEw ENG. J. MEn. 1282, 1283 (1978).
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industry experts to say what that practice is. This paradigm "works"-
yielding consistency and predictability-to the extent that there
is (1) clarity about what industry practice is and (2) agreement that in-
dustry practice strikes an acceptable balance between costs and benefits.
Both are lacking in the medical sphere. The great diversity of medical-
practice styles, both within and between health plans, offers litigants many
opportunities to contest the question of what constitutes industry practice.
This virtually guarantees inconsistent, unpredictable adjudicative out-
comes. For the reasons discussed above, we lack the empirical and norma-
tive certainty necessary to agree on "correct" outcomes. To the extent that
industry practices can be specified, the multiple failings of the medical
marketplace raise widely held doubts about the appropriateness of the cost-
benefit trade-offs built into these practices. These doubts have sown the
seeds for challenges to medical tort law's traditional deference to profes-
sional standards of care. 39
An alternative approach to specifying standards of clinical care for
tort law looks to medical and other experts, armed with empirical data, to
make the necessary cost-benefit trade-offs and to set evidence-based prac-
tice standards. 4 ' This approach founders on the problems of scientific un-
certainty, limited cognitive capacity, and moral irresolution discussed
herein. Any set of cost-benefit trade-offs and resulting practice standards is
open to plausible challenges, rooted in alternative empirical assumptions,
cognitive predispositions, and normative premises. Without an independent
basis for treating particular practice standards as authoritative in particular
contexts, legal indeterminacy and intractable conflicts inevitably ensue.
B. Disputes Over Medical Coverage
In theory, contract law permits the parties to medical transactions to
choose the practice standards by which they will be bound, or at least to
narrow the range of clinical alternatives by agreeing to general cost-benefit
trade-off guidelines.' 4' However, courts have not allowed health care pro-
viders to contract out of the tort system's approach to setting standards of
care. Insurance coverage for clinical services is a different matter, although
the managed care revolution has blurred the line between coverage and
provision of services. The courts have tended to treat coverage disputes as
questions of contract law, albeit subject to the specialized, almost tort-like
139. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Murphy, 640 N.E.2d 764, 767 n.6 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994) (stating that
local custom is only one of several factors in determining standard of care); see also Clark C.
Havighurst, Practice Guidelines as Legal Standards Governing Physician Liability, LAW & CONTEMP.
POBs., Winter-Spring 1991, at 87, 116-17.
140. See Sackett & Rosenberg, supra note 56; Richard E. Leahy, Comment, Rational Health
Policy and the Legal Standard of Care: A Call for Judicial Deference to Medical Practice Guidelines,
77 CALIF. L. REV. 1483 (1989).
141. See HAVIGHURST, supra note 29, at 22.
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interpretive principles that judges classically apply to insurance contracts.
Actions against insurers for injunctive relief (to compel provision of denied
benefits) and breach of contract traditionally benefit from canons of con-
struction that favor insureds when insurance-contract provisions are
ambiguous or complex. 4 2 On the other hand, the law gives effect to unam-
biguous, clearly drafted insurance coverage exclusions'43 and, as Clark
Havighurst has observed, would probably permit the contractual grant of
authority to health plans to make coverage decisions based on clearly
stated cost-benefit trade-off principles.'" To the consternation of
Havighurst and other advocates of explicit rationing via ex ante contractual
consent, health plans have not explicitly asserted this authority in their sub-
scriber agreements. Rather, they have stuck to the traditional standard for
coverage decisions, the opaque "medical necessity" test.
Like the tort standard of reasonable care, medical-necessity clauses in
health-plan contracts derive their specific content from external sources.
Before the 1980s, courts tended to treat medical-necessity provisions as
contractual commitments to pay for all services judged appropriate by
treating physicians, so long as these judgments were consonant with pro-
fessional standards of care.'45 To constrain treating physicians' power to
spend, insurers began adding contractual provisions reserving for them-
selves the authority to determine medical necessity. Courts have accepted
the general idea of such constraints, but they have closely scrutinized the
fairness of insurers' internal appeal procedures,'46 the adequacy of notice to
subscribers concerning appeal rights and plans' power to decide medical
necessity,'47 and the reasonableness of insurers' medical-necessity determi-
nations.' Legal disputes over coverage have tended to play out in these
areas.'49 Although judicial examination of plans' notice and appeals
142. These include the principles that courts should construe ambiguous contract language (1) in
favor of the "reasonable expectations of the insured" and (2) against the interests of the drafters. See
generally Kenneth S. Abraham, Judge-Made Law and Judge-Made Insurance: Honoring the
Reasonable Expectations of the Insured, 67 VA. L. REV. 1151 (1981) (criticizing judicial use of these
doctrines to expand insurance coverage after-the-fact).
143. See, e.g., Lewis v. Trustmark Ins. Co., No. 98-2493, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 15746 (4th Cir.
July 12, 1999) (per curiam) (holding that the plan administrator did not abuse its discretion by finding a
treatment "experimental" as defined by the plan, then subsequently denying coverage); Martin v. Blue
Cross & Blue Shield of Va., Inc., 115 F.3d 1201 (4th Cir. 1997).
144. HAVIGHURST, supra note 29, at 113.
145. E.g., Van Vactor v. Blue Cross Ass'n, 365 N.E.2d 638 (I11. App. Ct. 1977).
146. See Engalla v. Permanente Med. Group, 938 P.2d 903 (Cal. 1997).
147. See Sarchett v. Blue Shield of Cal., 729 P.2d 267 (Cal. 1987)
148. See, e.g., Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 470 So. 2d 1060 (Ala. 1984); Tudor v. Metro. Life
Ins. Co., 539 N.Y.S.2d 690 (N.Y. Dist. Ct. 1989).
149. Contractual exclusions for experimental or investigational treatment have been another nidus
of legal conflict over coverage. Construing such provisions pursuant to ERISA, federal district courts in
Minnesota and New Jersey ordered payment for bone-marrow transplants for multiple myeloma.
Leonhardt v. Holden Bus. Forms Co., 828 F. Supp. 657 (D. Minn. 1993); Dozsa v. Crum & Forster Ins.
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procedures takes some account of dignitary and other nonutilitarian, due
process concerns, reliance on contract law as the basis for judicial review
of insurers' coverage decisions has encouraged courts to consider coverage
issues in economics-oriented terms.
When the meaning of ambiguous contract language is at issue, "black
letter" contract doctrine frames the question for the courts as an inquiry
into what the parties-insurers and insureds-mutually intended.' Such
mutual intent is, in truth, absent for the vast majority of medical-necessity
determinations, since insurance purchasers (subscribers or their employers)
cannot anticipate and plan for the almost infinite range of clinical circum-
stances they might someday confront. Contract law treats the problem of
absence of mutual intent by searching for the most reasonable way to fill
the gap, 5' and contemporary contract jurisprudence defines reasonableness
in utilitarian terms. Thus, judicial review of medical-necessity determina-
tions under contract law principles is largely an inquiry into the economic
rationality of insurers' decisions-an inquiry subject to all of the cognitive
constraints and empirical and normative indeterminacies discussed in this
Article.
Some subscriber contracts seek to cabin this inquiry through language
requiring that medical necessity be determined in accordance with health
plans' clinical-practice and payment protocols. But health plans rarely
make these protocols available to consumers. To the contrary, plans often
insist that their payment rules are proprietary.'52 Since contract law does
not permit enforcement of terms known or accessible only to one party,
health plans' efforts to preempt disputes over medical-necessity determina-
tion by invoking such protocols stand on weak legal ground. Were health
plans to put even general language in their contracts setting forth system-
wide cost-benefit trade-off policies, courts might tolerate detailed payment
protocols that aim to give these policies rough effect. But, health plans
have so far shied away from doing so. The opaque medical-necessity pro-
visions in almost all health-insurance contracts do not acknowledge, let
alone ordain the weighing of benefits against costs.
Were some bold health-plan managers to offer contracts with explicit
cost-benefit balancing principles, the pervasive empirical and normative
indeterminacies discussed above would preclude a single, definitive
Co., 716 F. Supp. 131, 140 (D.N.J. 1989). Addressing the same issue, however, a district court in
Arizona denied payment. See Lehman v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 806 F. Supp. 859 (D. Ariz. 1992).
150. "Black letter" contract law calls for interpretation of ambiguous terms such as "medical
necessity" through inquiry into the parties' shared intent. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONTRACTS
§ 201 (1979) (rules in aid of interpretation).
151. This gap-filling approach is sometimes explicit and other times implicit in the legal fiction of
an inquiry into what the parties would have intended.
152. See Contract Issues and Quality Standards for Managed Care: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Health and Env't of the House Comm. on Commerce, 104th Cong., (1996) (statement of
Karen Ignani, President and CEO, Am. Ass'n of Health Plans).
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translation of these principles into comprehensive protocols for treatment
and payment. These indeterminacies would leave much room for unsatis-
fied patients and providers to contest denials of benefits and little guidance
for judges, arbitrators, or others faced with such disputes. The result would
be case-by-case incoherence and unpredictability and a high degree of legal
conflict over denials of coverage.
Absent any contract language constraining the assessment of medical
need, the space for conflict over health plans' medical-necessity determina-
tions is even wider. Both contract and tort law principles prescribe open-
ended inquiry into a coverage decision's reasonableness-inquiry bounded
only by the ability of the opposing parties to marshall expert testimony on
behalf of one or another purported standard of appropriate care. 53 The cur-
rent explosion of litigation in this area and the emergence of medical-
coverage disputes as a front-and-center political issue154 are thus hardly
surprising. Nor is it surprising that managed health plans have devoted
considerable resources'55 to the campaign to preserve their immunity, under
the federal Employees Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA"), from
suits for compensatory damages arising from denial of coverage.'56 Were
153. Federal and state rules of evidence have been applied to permit the admission of such medical
testimony without regard for its scientific basis. Even under the Federal Rules, which have been
construed to require judges to screen proffered scientific evidence for scientific validity, see Daubert v.
Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), medical testimony material to an issue of fact is
admitted without judicial assessment of its scientific foundation, so long as the proffered expert
qualifies on the basis of her professional credentials. However, medical testimony offered in toxic-tort
cases is subjected to Daubert review. See, e.g., Moore v. Ashland Chem., Inc., 126 F.3d 679 (5th Cir.
1997).
154. See, e.g., Ceci Connolly, Gore Outlines Proposal on Health Care; Guaranteed Coverage for
Children is Pledged, WASH. POST, Sept. 8, 1999, at A4; Amy Goldstein & David S. Broder, Health
Care Growing as 2000 Issue, WASH. POST, July 11, 1999, at Al. Through the summer of 2001, as both
houses of Congress debated, then passed, versions of the so-called Patients' Bill of Rights, legal
remedies for denial of coverage remained a front-burner political issue. September eleventh and its
political aftermath pushed this issue at least temporarily to the periphery of the congressional agenda.
155. The Health Insurance Association of America contributed $114,862 to federal candidates
during the 1997-98 election cycle. The American Association of Health Plans contributed $43,075
during the same period. These contributions from the two major health-insurance and managed care
trade associations do not include donations made by individual companies or their employees. See The
Center for Responsive Politics, Political Action Committees, at http://www.opensecrets.org/pacs (last
visited Nov. 7, 2002).
156. ERISA's preemption of state regulation of employee benefit plans, 29 U.S.C. § 514 (1997),
was construed by courts during the early and mid-1990s to bar state tort and contract actions against
employer-provided health plans for denial of coverage, whether or not such plans are self-insured. E.g.,
Corcoran v. United HealthCare, Inc., 965 F.2d 1321 (5th Cir. 1992). More recently, the U.S. Supreme
Court and some lower courts have signaled a cutback of this immunity. See supra note 9. But ERISA
preemption's ultimate fate remains to be determined. Approximately 160 million Americans obtain
their medical coverage through the workplace and thus face the possibility of ERISA preemption of
state law claims against health plans for negligent administration of plan benefits. Consumers with
employment-based medical coverage cannot pursue federal actions against their health plans for
compensatory damages. ERISA has been construed to permit them to sue in federal court only for the
value of coverage denied. See Corcoran, 965 F.2d at 1334-38.
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health plans to lose this immunity, the threat of a new surge of litigation
would put great pressure on them to be more generous in their medical-
necessity determinations, which would in turn increase their costs in a
fiercely competitive environment. Resolution of disputes over medical ne-
cessity requires answers to scientific mysteries that the medical community
has not yet solved and normative questions that American society is not
close to putting to rest.
C. Legal Safeguards for Medical Professionalism
The law insulates professional authority in a number of ways from
market and political pressures. Organized medicine's response to the man-
aged care industry's rising power has focused on preserving and enlarging
these protections. Proscriptions against medical practice by corporations,"'7
professional control of state medical licensing and disciplinary bodies, 58
and federal and state reliance on credentialing decisions made by private-
sector professional organizations'59 are examples of existing patterns of
protection and deference to professional authority. Efforts to expand such
protection include lobbying of state legislatures to limit health plans'
power to contract selectively with providers (by enacting "any willing
provider" statutes and restrictions on physician "deselection") and the cam-
paign to win exemption from antitrust and other restrictions on medical
unionization.16
Not surprisingly, the managed care industry has vigorously resisted
these efforts, warning that medical unionization and restrictions on selec-
tive contracting would seriously weaken the industry's ability to harness
market forces on behalf of more cost conscious, and thus more rational, use
of medical resources.' 6 ' Organized medicine counters with variations
on the traditional claim that consumer ignorance about health care and
157. Although corporations, primarily health plans and hospitals, exercise considerable influence
on clinical judgment, it remains the case in most jurisdictions that only physicians can make (and be
held personally accountable for) medical decisions. Physicians and Surgeons, 61 AM. JUR. 2D, at § 54
(1981). Of course, to the extent that health plans and hospitals, through coverage protocols and other
policies, set the parameters within which physicians must act, the prohibition on corporate practice of
medicine is a formalism without bite.
158. See Edward P. Richards, The Police Power and the Regulation of Medical Practice: A
Historical Review and Guide for Medical Licensing Board Regulation of Physicians in ER1SA-
Qualified Managed Care Organizations, 8 ANN. HEALTH L. 201 (1999).
159. Such diverse matters as institutional licensing, participation in publicly funded programs, and
courtroom admission of expert testimony are tied to credentials issued by medical-specialty societies
and boards.
160. E.g., Legal Scope of Proposed Antitrust Waiver for Physicians Debated Before House Panel,
HEALTH L. REP. (BNA) No. 25, June 24, 1999, at 1017; Doctors Drawn to Unions by Abuses in Health
Care System, Conference Told, HEALTH L. REP. (BNA) No. 39, Oct. 7, 1999, at 1624.
161. See Quality Health-Care Coalition Act of 1999: Hearing Before the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 104th Cong. (June 22, 1999) (airing views strongly opposed to collective bargaining by
physicians).
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physicians' expertise and ethical commitment to patients 16 2 make medical
judgment, insulated from market pressures, the preferable basis for allocat-
ing clinical resources. In legislatures, regulatory bodies, and the public
arena more generally, the common currency of the debate over the place of
professionalism in health care and of legal protections for it has been the
comparative efficacy of market forces and professional judgment from a
social welfare-maximizing perspective. To be sure, proponents of insulat-
ing professional judgment from market pressures tend to stress the benefits
for patients rather than for society as a whole. But this patient-centered
perspective is tied to a particular conception of social welfare-and of ra-
tionality and efficiency-that puts a premium on the concerns of the sick
over the preferences of consumers in general.
Thus the debate over the role of professional judgment and authority
in health care is, at the core, a contest between understandings of what effi-
ciency requires. The empirical uncertainties and normative disagreements
considered in this Article translate into conflict between these understand-
ings. Competing interest groups, especially the medical profession and the
managed care industry, drive this conflict, and shifting balances of political
influence may settle particular legislative and regulatory questions (at least
for a time). But our underlying empirical and normative irresolution creates
the climate for this conflict. Claims contrary to settled empirical or norma-
tive consensus could not gain political traction. The absence of consensus
makes space for sharply differing views about the appropriate place of pro-
fessional judgment and authority in health care provision.
D. Health Care Antitrust Law
Maximization of consumer welfare is the animating principle of con-
temporary antitrust law; 163 thus antitrust enforcement in the health sector
162. See Arrow, supra note 54.
163. Strictly speaking, antitrust law targets anticompetitive trade practices without reference to
consumer welfare. But when confronting "market failure" and "rule of reason" defenses to allegations
of anticompetitive behavior, courts have looked for guidance to the ideal of the perfectly competitive,
welfare-maximizing marketplace. When they have found market failures that cause competitive
behavior to reduce social welfare, courts have permitted private restraints on this behavior, reasoning
that such restraints improve social welfare in a manner akin to a better-functioning marketplace. See,
e.g., Cal. Dental Ass'n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756 (1999) (upholding dental association's restrictions on
advertising of fees as "procompetitive," and therefore acceptable under "rule of reason" analysis, on the
ground that the restrictions reduced the possibility of consumer misunderstandings). This approach
preserves, in form, the antitrust ideal of the competitive marketplace, while transforming much of
antitrust law, in practice, into open-ended inquiry into the efficiency of the conduct at issue. Critics of
this approach contend that it turns the antitrust inquiry into whether a practice is "procompetitive" or
"anticompetitive" on its face by empowering judges to attach the "procompetitive" label to restrictions
on competition that they believe further social welfare. Peter Carstensen & Bette Roth, The Per Se
Legality of Some Naked Restraints: A (Re)conceptualization of the Antitrust Analysis of Cartelistic
Organizations, ANTITRUST BULL., Summer 2000, at 349, 415. Proponents of greater reliance on
markets in health care matters warn that this approach opens a door "much wider than is prudent" to
physicians' self-serving restraints on competition. Havighurst, supra note 17, at 952.
20031
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unabashedly pursues efficiency. In passing on mergers, acquisitions, and
collaborative arrangements, enforcement agencies and courts look to
whether the combinations at issue produce consumer welfare loss.164 Per se
proscriptions against some arrangements rest on generalized, categorical
judgments about their effects on consumer welfare. So-called "rule of
reason" inquiries into combinations not prohibited per se involve
individualized, case-by-case consideration of consumer-welfare effects.
Resolution of health care antitrust law disputes thus requires choices
between competing conceptions of efficiency in medicine.
The most bitterly contested questions in medical antitrust law today
involve combinations of physicians and other health care providers in re-
sponse to the market pressures of the managed care revolution.'65 Antitrust-
enforcement guidelines adopted jointly by the U.S. Department of Justice
and the Federal Trade Commission 6 6 put great weight on financial risk-
bearing as a measure of whether collaborative arrangements among pro-
viders enhance or undermine consumer welfare. The guidelines' strong
preference for risk bearing by providers is rooted in the premise that, for
any given degree of market power, integration of health care financing and
provision yields clinical resource use closer to the optimum than do fee-
for-service payment arrangements. Undergirding this premise are many
contestable empirical claims and normative judgments. They involve such
matters as: the comparative degree to which at-risk and fee-for-service
providers consider the costs of tests and treatments and the clinical conse-
quences of foregoing them, the comparative extent to which these differ-
ently paid providers weigh the benefits of preventive services, the
inclinations of at-risk and fee-for-service providers to practice evidence-
based medicine and to value clinical results in accordance with consumer
preferences, the privileging of consumer preferences at the point of health-
plan subscription versus the moment of clinical decision, and the import of
role conflict (and potential patient mistrust) engendered by financial incen-
tives to withhold beneficial care. 67
The empirical uncertainties and normative disagreements that have
been this Article's focus suffuse these and other underlying questions. We
have good reason to believe that fee-for-service practice and coverage is
wasteful-that, in general, it engenders overspending relative to clinical
benefits achieved. However, we lack analytic tools for quantifying this
164. See Peter J. Hammer, Medical Antitrust Arrangements: Coase and the Changing Structure of
the Firm, in THE PRIVATIZATION OF HEALTH CARE REFORM: LEGAL AND REGULATORY PERSPECTIVES,
113-57 (M. Gregg Bloche ed., 2003).
165. Id.
166. U.S. DEP'T. OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM'N, STATEMENTS OF ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT
POLICY IN HEALTH CARE (1996), available at http://www. usdoj.gov:80/atr/public/guidelines/OOOO.pdf.
167. See David Mechanic & Mark Schlesinger, The Impact of Managed Care on Patients' Trust in
Medical Care and Their Physicians, 275 JAMA 1693 (1996).
[Vol. 91:247
HeinOnline -- 91 Cal. L. Rev. 296 2003
2003] THE INVENTION OF HEALTH LA W
waste. The concept of moral hazard is central to contemporary economic
thinking about clinical waste. Yet, as I argued above, moral hazard cannot
yield measures of waste unless supplemented by speculative resolution of
empirical unknowns and by agreement on normative matters that remain
fervently contested. We are thus hardly in a position to opine with confi-
dence, as do the antitrust-enforcement agencies, that putting providers at
insurance risk is more efficient or rational than third-party, fee-for-service
payment, with all its flaws. Neither, for that matter, is there sound basis for
the competing claim, pressed in the political arena by doctors and hospi-
tals,'68 that exempting providers from antitrust restrictions on non-risk
bearing combinations will enhance consumer welfare. In antitrust, as in
other areas of health law, efficiency is insufficiently determinate to yield
clear, durable answers to the most contested questions.
E. Regulation of Capital Investment
Efforts to contain medical spending through regulatory constraints on
health care providers' capital spending reached a peak in the 1970s and
have been on the wane since. Once required by federal law,'69 so-called
Certificate of Need ("CON") regulation of spending on new construction
and large-scale technology purchases now persists in fewer than half of the
states.17 The CON approach entails, in essence, the use of medical-practice
protocols at the macro level. State regulators' decisions to issue or deny
CONs for new construction or technology are supposed to be made by
168. Hammer, supra note 164.
169. National Health Planning and Resources Development Act of 1974 ("NHPRDA"), 42 U.S.C.
§ 300m(d), 300m-2(a)(4)(B) (1976) (repealed 1993). The repealed sections of NHPRDA required states
to designate agencies to perform "Certificate of Need" review of health facilities and services or else
lose federal funds for development, expansion, and support of health resources.
170. Twenty-six states and territories have some form of Certificate of Need regulation for
hospitals or home health care facilities. ALA. CODE. §§ 22-21-260 to 22-21-278 (1994); ALASKA STAT.
§§ 18.07.011-18.07.021 (Michie 1995); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 19a-633 to 19a-645 (1994) (licensing
and state budget review); FLA. STAT. ch. 408 (1993 & Supp. 1994); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 31-6-1 to 31-6-
70 (1994); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 323d-l to 323d-54 (1989); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 216B.010-
216B.030 (Banks-Baldwin 1994); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, §§ 301-324 (West 1994); MD. CODE
ANN., HEALTH-GEN. 11, §§ 19-101 to 19-222 (1994); MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 222.22201-222.22260
(1995); Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 41-7-171 to 41-7-209 (1995); Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 197.300-197.366
(1995); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 50-5-301 to 50-5-316 (1994); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 71-5801 to 71-5870
(1994); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 151-C:l to 151-C:15 (1994); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 26:2H-1 to 26:21-
39 (West 1994); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 131E-175 to 131E-190 (1995); OHIO REV. CODE. ANN.
§§ 3702.51 to 3702.60 (Anderson 1995); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, §§ 1-850 to 1-858 (West 1995); 35
PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 448.701-448.712 (2000); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 44-7-320 to 44-7-460 (Law. Co-op.
1976); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 68-11-101 to 68-11-125 (1994); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 32.1-102.1 to 32.1-
102.11 (Michie 1994); 19 V.I. CODE ANN. § 223 (1994); WASH. REV. CODE §§ 70.38.015-70.38.920
(1995); W. VA. CODE §§ 16-2D-1 to 16-2D-15 (1995). Cf Patrick John McGinley, Comment, Beyond
Health Care Reform: Reconsidering Certificate of Need Laws in a "Managed Competition" System,
23 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 141 (1995); J. Duncan Moore, Jr., CON Survival Struggle, MOD. HEALTHCARE,
Aug. I1, 1997, at 32; Thorn Wilder, Ohio Law Highlights Sweeping Changes for State CON Programs,
4 HEALTH L. REP. (BNA) No. 4, June I, 1995, at 829.
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reference to guidelines detailing optimal ratios of different types of hospital
beds, diagnostic-imaging machines, outpatient facilities, and so on to
numbers of people in the geographic area served. To the extent that CON
regulation succeeds in holding the supply of some services below (insur-
ance-driven) demand, allocation among patients with competing needs is
negotiated by attending physicians and hospital or clinic administrators.'17
Thus the CON strategy entails a quest for systemic efficiency at sev-
eral stages-development of protocols specifying optimal ratios of plant
and equipment to people, case-by-case regulatory decision making based
on these protocols, and allocation of scarce facilities and technology
among individual patients. At all of these levels, the indeterminacies dis-
cussed in this Article come into play. Absent scientific evidence for the
efficacy of most clinical interventions and society-wide agreement on how
to value multitudinous states of health and illness, promulgation of proto-
cols specifying optimal levels of plant-and-equipment is speculative to the
point of arbitrariness. Application of such protocols to particular capital
projects is bedeviled by difficulties involved in defining populations served
by proposed and preexisting facilities and evaluating these populations'
preferences and states of health. Allocation at the micro level, among indi-
vidual patients, is vexed by our inability to project clinical outcomes and to
agree on how to value and compare states of health and illness in individ-
ual cases.
The result is indeterminacy that engenders intractable conflict at all
three levels. State regulators' CON decisions have often been the subject of
paralytic litigation 72 over both the content of population-wide protocols
specifying ratios of plant and equipment to people and the application of
such protocols to individual cases. At the clinical level, the politics of per-
sonal influence among attending physicians and administrators mediate the
tensions that build as patients queue up for services when demand exceeds
supply. 73 To the extent that this politics becomes visible to patients, it
erodes confidence in the fairness of allocative decisions.'74 It also raises the
troubling prospect of systemic bias against members of disadvantaged
171. See Harris, supra note 27.
172. See Payton & Powsner, supra note 25.
173. See Harris, supra note 27.
174. Large, widespread supply-demand mismatches in clinical settings invite corruption in the
form of bribes to physicians and clinical administrators in exchange for preferred access to services.
The potential for such corruption was dramatically illustrated by the bribes routinely demanded and
paid within the Soviet Union's health care system, which promised state-financed universal access but
was, in practice, grossly undercapitalized (and understaffed) relative to population-wide demand. Mark
G. Field, The Health Crisis in the Former Soviet Union: A Report from the 'Post-War' Zone, 41 Soc.
ScL. & MED. 1469 (1995).
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groups, who are less likely on average to be attended by those physicians
with the most influence in clinical settings. 75
III
THE LAW OF HEALTH CARE PROVISION, RECONCEIVED
Welfare maximization as an organizing principle for the law of health
care provision founders upon pervasive indeterminacy. This indeterminacy
leaves broad scope for legal conflict. The result is instability, inconsis-
tency, and unpredictability in health law. An unsavory byproduct is a wide
opening for the politics of interest group and personal influence. At the
macro level, health plans, providers, and employers spend large amounts to
lobby Congress and state legislatures, finance friendly candidates' cam-
paigns, and make their cases to courts and regulatory agencies. At the pa-
tient-care level, the lack of clear, uncontested guideposts enlarges the role
of personal relationships and persuasion when clinical caretakers and ad-
ministrators make allocative choices in individual cases. An ironic conse-
quence is that commitment to social-welfare maximization as a
harmonizing principle for health law risks undermining confidence in
health law as a reasoned, consistent scheme of governance. Pervasive un-
predictability also frustrates the law's crucial function as a set of reliable
baseline or default rules and principles that create a foundation for private
ordering via contract.
Moreover, the language of welfare maximization risks diverting legal
decision makers' attention from the underlying substance of health policy
disagreements. By collapsing diverse substantive concerns onto a single
metaphorical yardstick-efficiency-for the disposition of health law and
policy disputes, talk of welfare maximization discourages consideration of
the disparate empirical uncertainties and moral tensions that animate these
disputes. This has serious practical consequences. Inattention to underlying
substantive concerns fosters inconsistent, unpredictable resolution of legal
disputes, undermining the quest for more rational health policy. And the
low profile of underlying substantive concerns in the language of health
law makes deliberative, democratic choice in health-policy matters less
likely.
A. Citizens' Expectations and the Purposes of Medicine
There is an urgent need to reconceive the law of health care provision
in a manner that avoids these failings. If this diverse body of law is to gov-
ern the managed care revolution in accord with our values, needs, and cog-
nitive constraints-if it is to cabin destructive conflict and foster
175. See RAYMOND S. DUFF & AUGUST B. HOLLINGSHEAD, SICKNESS AND SOCIETY (1968)
(discussing links between patients' social status and access to physicians able to assert influence in
hospital settings on their patients' behalf).
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confidence in legal governance as reasoned, consistent, and reliable to the
extent possible-it must pursue more manageable aims. These aims should
emerge, in a democracy, from our hopes and expectations for the health
care system, both as individuals and as public-regarding citizens. 176 Were
we to insist on one or another idealized conception of health law's aims,
divorced from our actual hopes and expectations, the resulting legal design
could not sustain public acceptance. 177 Inevitably, these hopes and expecta-
tions will clash, just as our perspectives as patients, friends and family of
the sick, and public-regarding citizens often conflict. Thus a principal func-
tion of the law of health care provision must be to manage such conflict as
it arises.
The law of health care provision must also be tailored to the peculiar
organizational, economic, cultural, and scientific features of contemporary
medical care. The high value that legal culture puts on consistency of legal
interpretation within doctrinal realms 78 discourages custom tailoring of the
law to the unique characteristics of different human endeavors. Applied to
health law's disparate doctrinal bases, the lawyer's ideal of doctrinal con-
sistency across diverse spheres of human activity not only discourages
law's pragmatic adaptation to health care's particularities; it furthers the
fragmentation of the health system's regulatory and legal governance7 9 by
encouraging the uncoordinated development of legal doctrines that send
contradictory signals to the system's actors. 8 ' Judicial self-restraint de-
serves its due. The courts' legitimacy in the public's eye rests heavily on
their reluctance to engage in the wholesale policymaking that is the prov-
ince of elected officials.'' But this legitimacy is at risk when judges' pur-
suit of formal consistency yields confusing and contradictory substantive
messages to those who must follow the law. Legitimacy requires a balance
176. To be sure, there need to be limits to such democratic deference. A thorough exploration of
how to set these limits is beyond this Article's scope, but in general I would argue that these limits
should comport with reigning conceptions of fundamental human rights. This approach, of course, has
its share of indeterminacy, but it clearly rules out some legal practices, such as race and gender
discrimination, that might arise from unconstrained democratic deference.
177. 1 break self-consciously here with scholars who ground their approaches to the law and policy
of health care provision upon one or another idealized philosophic model. E.g., EPSTEIN, supra note 28
(libertarian paradigm); NORMAN DANIFLS, JUST HEALTH CARE 42-48 (1985) (Rawlsian model). These
idealized models enrich public and scholarly debate but cannot ultimately prevail over impassioned
human expectations.
178. See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 225-75 (1986).
179. Havighurst, supra note 133.
180. M. Gregg Bloche, The Managed Care Revolution and Patients' Rights: Potential Institute of
Medicine Initiatives (1999) (unpublished background paper, on file with the National Academy of
Sciences, Institute of Medicine). Whether, as a general matter, one inclines toward legal formalism or
to a species of realism, the health system's peculiarities and health law's fragmented doctrinal bases
and jurisdictional origins make a compelling case for a realist approach to the legal governance of
medicine.
181. See Hammer, supra note 9 (discussing judicial misgivings about engaging overtly in
policymaking in the health sphere).
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between judicial self-restraint and substantive coherence. Legislative
inaction in an area as fraught with conflict as is health care merits height-
ened judicial emphasis on substantive coherence.18 2
Last June, the Supreme Court showed a new sensitivity to the need to
take substance seriously in the health sphere. Confronting the convolutions
of ERISA preemption'8 3 in a case involving state-mandated, independent
review of HMO coverage denials, the Court considered the institutional
means by which HMOs meld health care financing and service provi-
sion.'84 The Court based its holding-that ERISA does not preempt such
mandates-on its finding that HMOs both bear financial risk and provide
medical care.'85 Such attention to "facts on the ground" will be essential if
health law is to send coherent regulatory messages.
It is far beyond the scope of this Article to specify aims in detail for
health law and to determine the implications of these aims for the resolu-
tion of health law's many controversies. Rather, I attempt in a general way
to identify health law's major, conflicting aims' 86-aims democratically
rooted in people's expectations and hopes for the health system. I then of-
fer some preliminary suggestions about how this understanding of legal
aims might contribute to the management of conflict in the health sphere.
B. The Aims of Health Law
Courts should refashion health law, within its disparate doctrinal
realms, to spotlight the substantive empirical and normative questions that
animate legal disputes. Health law cannot finesse or do away with dis-
agreements that neither our society nor our politics have been able to re-
solve. However, when disputes between parties arise, health law can and
should make underlying empirical and normative questions explicit. And,
182. Cf GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES (1982) (arguing for
aggressive judicial reinterpretation, and on occasion, judicial repeal of outmoded and obsolete statutes).
183. See supra notes 3-9 and accompanying text.
184. See Rush Prudential HMO v. Moran, 122 S. Ct. 2151, 2160-62 (2002) (reviewing the diverse
organizational and contractual mechanisms by which HMOs and other managed health plans combine
financial risk-bearing and health care provision). The Court's review of organizational and contractual
mechanisms drew upon (albeit not extensively) health care financing and health policy literature of the
sort rarely cited in judicial opinions.
185. The appellant HMO had contested this proposition on the ground that the managed care
industry is evolving in ways that increasingly separate financial risk-bearing and medical care
provision. The Court concluded, however, that combination of risk-bearing and service provision
remains a "dominant feature" of managed care. See id. at 2161 (holding that HMOs' financial risk-
bearing brings their coverage decision-making within the scope of ERISA's so-called "insurance
savings" clause, which shields state insurance regulation from ERISA preemption). The appellant,
Justice Souter wrote for the Court, "cannot checkmate common sense by trying to submerge HMOs'
insurance features beneath an exclusive characterization of HMOs as providers of health care." Id. at
2162.
186. My choice of the word "aims" here over the term "principles" is intentional. It reflects the
diffuse, even inchoate, quality of democratically set goals, in contrast to the more fully defined quality
of principles.
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when courts must answer these questions, they should do so candidly.
Doing so would clear a path toward substantive coherence and predictabil-
ity, both within and across doctrinal settings. It would enable actors in the
health sphere to draw consistent messages from the law, to conform their
conduct accordingly, and to question these messages cogently in both the
legal and political arenas. It would empower the public and enrich the de-
mocratic process by making health law's choices more visible. It would
thereby render legislative action more responsive to public values and less
open to special-interest-group influence.
Beyond this, courts should encourage health insurers and care provid-
ers to present consumers with care and coverage options in a manner that
makes cost-benefit trade-offs explicit. Legal rules should reward contrac-
tual candor about painful trade-offs, so as to encourage consumers to un-
derstand and reflect upon these trade-offs. Health law should take a dim
view of contractual efforts to submerge hard substantive choices in euphe-
mism, as occurs, for example, when insurers promise all "medically
necessary" care, then seek, sub rosa, to ration care.'87
The vision of legal dispute resolution I have in mind does not dis-
pense with rationality; rather, it aspires to rationality in a more incremental
form,'88 adaptable to complexity and indeterminacy. For the most part, I
dispense with the language of economics and the characterization of regu-
latory and legal decision making as cost-benefit calculus. I do not view this
discourse as either inherently inhumane, as do some commentators,18 9 or as
187. The Supreme Court sent a signal to this effect in Rush Prudential HMO v. Moran, 122 S. Ct.
2151 (2002), by rejecting Rush Prudential's characterization of state-mandated independent "medical
necessity" review as a matter of contract interpretation. Instead, the Justices treated "medical necessity"
review as akin to a requirement that insurers obtain (and abide by) a second medical opinion, based on
"independent medical judgment," id. at 2168-69. In so doing, the Court construed the "medical
necessity" test for coverage as an indicator of contractual deference to professional standards of care-
standards made mandatory by state laws requiring independent medical review. But the Court noted
that health insurance contracts need not employ the "medical necessity" test. Id. at 2167, n. 10. To the
extent that insurance contracts limit coverage on other than "medical necessity" grounds, state laws
requiring independent "medical necessity" review do not apply, and insurers can hold patients and
providers to contractual standards. Id. The Court's opinion in Rush Presidential HMO thus invites
health plan designers and contract drafters to be explicit about cost-benefit trade-off rules and other
coverage exclusions. By doing so, health plans can avoid giving trump authority to physician-reviewers
(and the medical profession) in coverage matters.
188. See JON ELSTER, SOLOMONIC JUDGEMENTS: STUDIES IN THE LIMITATIONS OF RATIONALITY
175-216 (1989) (reviewing constraints on rationality in public policy formulation); see also Colin S.
Diver, Policymaking Paradigms in Administrative Law, 95 HARV. L. REV. 393 (1981) (defending
Herbert Simon's bounded-rationality paradigm as a pragmatic model for public policymaking); Charles
Lindblom, Still Muddling, Not Yet Through, 39 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 517 (1979); Charles Lindblom, The
Science of "Muddling Through ", 19 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 79 (1959).
189. See, e.g., Arthur Leff, Economic Analysis of Law: Some Realism About Nominalism, 60 VA.
L. REV. 451 (1974); George Annas, Reframing the Debate on Health Care Reform by Replacing Our
Metaphors, 332 NEW ENG. J. MED. 745 (1995); Rashi Fein, What Is Wrong with the Language of
Medicine, 306 NEW ENG. J. MED. 863 (1982). Cf Margaret Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L.
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incapable of characterizing decision analysis under conditions of bounded
rationality and normative controversy. To the contrary, as Guido Calabresi
has shown, 9 ' the language of economics and utility can be employed in an
empathic, morally rich fashion to explore our most passionately felt con-
cerns and the conflicts between them. Economics methodologies, more-
over, have been ingeniously adapted to characterize complex and uncertain
decision scenarios. 191
I depart from the language of economics and utility for strictly prag-
matic reasons. Speaking of our many deeply felt health-related concerns in
terms of a linear scale of costs and benefits adds nothing to our understand-
ing of these concerns and little to our thinking about how to balance these
concerns in particular cases. These concerns cannot be translated into dol-
lar or other numeric terms without prior moral or other normative judg-
ments, and the language of economics and utility is mute about how to
make these judgments. This language underscores the point that compara-
tive decisions must be made, within resource constraints, when concerns
conflict. But economics language is not needed to make this point, and col-
lapsing all competing concerns onto a single metric of cost and benefit 92
risks diverting legal decision makers' attention from the task of better un-
derstanding them.193
My effort to identify health law's aims starts with the uncontroversial
premise that promoting and restoring people's health matters greatly. Not
only is health a near-universal human want; good health is morally desir-
able as a prerequisite for pursuing work opportunities, 194 nurturing the
young and sustaining the family, and enjoying a rich range of recreational
REV. 1849 (1987) (arguing that market exchange of things closely tied to our ideals of "human
flourishing" degrades the persons who trade these things away).
190. See GuIDo CALABRESI & PHILIP BOBBITT, TRAGIC CHOICES (1978).
191. Measures that are incrementally rational, as opposed to systemically welfare maximizing, can
be modeled as a climb toward local, rather than global, maxima. ELSTER, supra note 84.
192. The idea of a single metric is particularly problematic when decision makers must think about
both the ultimate outcomes of alternative courses of action and the paths by which these outcomes are
to be achieved. The Nobel-Prize-winning economist (and critic of economics) Amartya Sen
distinguishes between "culmination outcomes" (ultimate outcomes) and "comprehensive outcomes,"
which include both culmination outcomes and the effects of the processes by which culmination
outcomes occur. Amartya Kumar Sen, Maximization and the Act of Choice, 65 ECONOMETRICA 745
(1997). Collapsing culmination outcomes and these process effects onto a single metric reduces the
visibility of all that is unique, or incommensurable, about these process effects. Welfare economics
typically limits its focus to the utility of culmination outcomes. The focus of health care economists on
the measurable outcomes of medical treatment is illustrative. However, I presently argue, the processes
by which medical outcomes come about matter at least as much as do culmination outcomes in health
care.
193. To the extent that conflict over what is "efficient" in health care law reflects unappreciated
differences between understandings of the aims of health care provision, language that reveals these
understandings is a necessary tool for management of such conflict. The reductionism inherent in
economics language is a barrier to rich, empathic discussions of these understandings.
194. See DANIELS, supra note 177, at 33-34 (making Rawlsian case for universal access to medical
care as a means for pursuing fair equality of opportunity ).
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opportunities. Moreover, in some religious traditions, regard and care for
the body is itself a spiritual obligation.'95 I depart, however, from the as-
sumption in most health law and bioethics commentary that attaining
health is the sole or even dominant purpose of medicine. Were pursuit of
health medicine's lone or dominant function, much that clinical caretakers
do-and that the law accepts, even insists upon-would make no sense.
Our health system commits vast resources to technologies that yield, at
best, small improvements in health status or prospects for prolonged life,
while it (and we as patients) forgoes opportunities to achieve larger health
gains at lower cost through more robust health promotion, disease preven-
tion, and early diagnosis and treatment. Ample evidence shows that such
measures-as well as society-wide efforts to protect the environment,
make workplaces safer, and alleviate poverty-yield larger health benefits
at lower cost than much of what clinicians do in intensive care units, organ-
transplant teams, and other high-technology settings. Some argue that this
disconnect between apparent cost-benefit thresholds for technology-
intensive medical services and for health-promoting clinical and social pro-
grams represents a large public policy failure, and that policymakers
should redirect resources from the former to the latter. Yet it is difficult to
imagine public acceptance for policies that would rechannel resources on a
huge scale from the technology-intensive care that holds out hope to people
in dire medical straits. Public policies that demanded such a profound shift
in spending on behalf of some abstract conception of population-wide
health improvement would surely meet strong popular resistance.'96
An understanding of health law's aims that builds democratically on
people's hopes and expectations for the health care system cannot dismiss
such feelings; rather, it must connect empathically with them. Though I
will not argue the point in depth, 9 ' I submit that the emotional and
moral imperatives of rescue drive much of our resistance to pursuit of
195. See, e.g., CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH, para. 2288-91 (Libreria Editrice Vaticana
trans., 2d ed. 1997) ("Life and physical health are precious gifts entrusted to us by God. We must take
reasonable care of them, taking into account the needs of others and the common good.").
196. Tamer proposals for the shifting of resources from high-technology care to other programs
yielding greater aggregate health or other benefits have in the past encountered fierce resistance. A
notable example is former Colorado Governor Richard Lamm's 1984 proposal to limit the elderly's use
of costly clinical technology, which ignited a media firestorm. See Editorial, Life, Death and Governor
Lamm, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31, 1984, at 22.
197. Commentators on environmental policy and tort law often note differences in our regard for
identified and statistical lives. See, e.g., BREYER, supra note 118, at 33-39; THOMAS C. SCHELLING, The
Life You Save May Be Your Own, in CHOICE AND CONSEQUENCE 113 (1984). Such commentary is
usually unsympathetic, typically dismissing these differences as the product of cognitive error or other
forms of irrationality. Some have even tried to explain these differences as evolutionary residue-ways
of thinking adaptive to our forest and cave-dwelling ancestors and thus biologically selected over a
long period, but maladaptive for people in present-day technological societies. E. Donald Elliott, The
Evolutionary Tradition in Jurisprudence, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 38 (1985). The possibility that they may
still be adaptive, in unrecognized ways, is not taken seriously in this literature.
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population-wide health maximization. Rescue, or at least nonabandonment,
of people struck by medical misfortune overlaps with promotion and resto-
ration of health, yet it is distinct in its rootedness in the value of standing
by people in distress, even at the expense of some abstract greater good.
The iconography of devotion to individuals at the expense of larger pur-
pose appears throughout our culture.'98 The recent surge of popular anger
toward managed care stems in part from its compromises between the
plight of individuals in distress and the requisites of population-wide re-
source management. To the extent that our intensive care units, bone-
marrow transplants, magnetic resonance imagers, and the like symbolically
express our commitment to stand by individuals in dire straits, their cost-
effectiveness at promoting health, compared with less-heroic clinical and
social interventions, seem beside the point. In a society as enthralled by
technology as ours, costly clinical measures that bring leading-edge tech-
nology to bear are potent expressions of this commitment, quite apart from
their biological efficacy.
This powerful emotional and moral imperative goes underrecognized
in commentary on the law of health care provision. Within the standard
story of waste, this imperative has no role except as a source of ineffi-
ciency. But a humane, pragmatic conception of health law's aims must
make room for it. To be sure, it may be a luxury in the economic sense: it
seems probable that societies with higher per capita incomes spend larger
fractions of their incomes on technology-intensive, rescue-oriented medical
care than do poorer societies.' 99 Yet so long as we treat the moral and pol-
icy problems of medical resource allocation as matters to be addressed
within national boundaries, the moral import of the rescue imperative
ought to be weighed from a Western, postindustrial perspective."'
198. Recent examples include the films SAVING PRIVATE RYAN (DreamWorks SKG 1998) and
BLACKHAWK DOWN (Columbia Pictures 2001), in which many people risk their lives to save one or a
few, and a costly and dangerous winter 1999 flight over the South Pole to drop medical supplies for a
researcher with a lump in her breast. Denise Grady, Trapped at the South Pole, Doctor Becomes a
Patient, N.Y. TIMEs, July 13, 1999, at Al; Ailing Doctor at South Pole Is Evacuated at Last, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 16, 1999, at A9. Rescue, courageously attempted, is an elemental dramatic theme in
literature and film and part of the moral learning we draw from our culture beginning in early
childhood.
199. In general, the poorer the country, the lower its medical spending as a proportion of gross
domestic product. Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, OECD Health Data 99
(1999), available at http://www.oecd.org/els/health/software99.htm (last visited May 2, 2000). The
bitter controversy in postapartheid South Africa over government efforts to make large budgetary shifts
from tertiary medical services to primary care and health promotion programs in largely Black areas,
see Gabrielle Murphy, South African Health Care in Black and White, 351 LANCET 1421 (1998),
highlights the tension between health spending priorities for people living at subsistence levels and
those living in postindustrial upper- and middle-class comfort.
200. I concede that this is troubling from an international social- and economic-rights perspective,
and that a powerful case can be made for allocating health resources based on a transnational
conception of justice that compels a large shift of resources from tertiary services in industrialized
states to health-promotion programs for the world's poorer nations. See HEALTH CARE REFORM: A
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Inevitably, the imperative of rescue will at times clash with the im-
peratives of health promotion and restoration; moreover, the rescue impera-
tive will itself often be open to differing interpretations. It is not my
purpose here to resolve such differences in the abstract. Although a deeper
exploration of the moral idea of rescue could clarify and enrich our theo-
retical understanding,2°' these differences will appear in concrete circum-
stances that demand particularized resolutions. My limited purpose here is
to enter a plea for the recognition of rescue as one of health care's (and
health law's) legitimate aims. Such recognition would not end legal and
regulatory disagreement over management of clinical resources, but it
would cabin such disputes by discouraging arguments that accord popula-
tion-wide health maximization trump value over the anguish of identified
persons. °2
An overlapping psychological imperative, also arising from the an-
guish of identified persons but meriting recognition as a distinct aim of
health care law, is support and comfort at the bedside and clinic, whether
or not rescue or restoration of health are possible. The recent proliferation
of research and commentary on end-of-life care has increased awareness of
this clinical purpose, but our needs for support and comfort are not re-
stricted to such dire circumstances. The anxieties of a new mother insecure
about breast-feeding, a healthy twenty-something awaiting a herpes cul-
ture, or a fit forty-something with marginally high blood cholesterol also
merit support, requiring caring health professionals to strike awkward,
nonutilitarian balances between these nonurgent needs and other patients'
more pressing circumstances.0 3 Effective clinical support is protean in its
expression, encompassing soothing voice tones and words, physical pres-
ence and touching, pain relief, biological and other explanation, and even
laboratory testing as both a demonstration of concern2  and a means of
HUMAN RIGHTS APPROACH 149 (Audrey R. Chapman ed., 1994). But such a shift of health resources
across national boundaries seems exceedingly unlikely in the foreseeable future; thus, treatment of
health-resource allocation as an intranational matter makes practical sense.
201. Among the many open questions not addressed herein are the relative moral import of
rescue's efficacy versus rescuers' feelings of commitment, rescuees' experiences of fear and
vulnerability, and the risks and costs of the rescue effort (risk and cost weigh, paradoxically and
simultaneously, in favor of a rescue endeavor's nobility and against its practicality).
202. Proponents of tightly managed care as a tool for rationalizing medical practice from a
population-wide outcomes perspective would prefer to see the law do exactly the opposite. See, e.g.,
David M. Eddy, Performance Measurement: Problems and Solutions, 17 HEALTH AFF., July-Aug.
1998, at 7.
203. A body of psychological research supports the conclusion that the intensity of subjectively
experienced need does not vary greatly along the continuum from comparatively minor (as seen
objectively) to dire needs. See generally A.H. MASLOW, MOTIVATION AND PERSONALITY (1987). That
we experience need in this objectively irrational manner should be intuitively apparent to anyone who
has ever felt momentarily furious over some trivial failure in, say, airline beverage service or a
consumer product.
204. M. Gregg Bloche & Kevin P. Quinn, Professionalism and Personhood, in PERSONHOOD IN
HEALTH CARE. 347-54 (David C. Thomasma et al. eds.. 2001).
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rendering biological explanation more credible and comforting.2°5 All have
in common the commitment of resources not wholly justifiable in terms of
rescue or health promotion and restoration. 26 The standard story of waste
that animates most scholarship on the law of health care provision makes
little or no allowance for such resource use.
A related moral imperative, respect for the dignity of people rendered
vulnerable by medical misfortune or fear, deserves recognition as a sepa-
rate aim of health law. For a generation, the bioethics movement has em-
phasized this imperative, and the law has come to recognize it, albeit to a
lesser degree than some bioethics commentators would prefer. The law
affirms this imperative with protections for patient self-determination in
clinical and research settings2°7 and safeguards for medical information
privacy,0 8 even when this imperative clashes with the exigencies of popu-
lation-wide health promotion.20 9 The older, Hippocratic tradition in medical
ethics affords protection for personal dignity in another fashion, through a
professional duty of undivided loyalty to patients. 210 This duty safeguards
sick, vulnerable people from the indignity of exploitation by doctors with
conflicts of interest and loyalty.2 ' Unfortunately, the law has not generally
recognized such a duty. For example, in cases involving financial rewards
to physicians for withholding care, courts have treated the conflict of inter-
est involved as either unproblematic if the care provided does not consti-
tute malpractice2 12 or as manageable through disclosure of and consent to
the financial incentives at issue.21
The paradigm of disclosure and consent has recently been stretched to
a point that raises doubts about its ability to protect personal dignity.
205. Different personality styles and cultural norms predispose people to varying patterns of
responsiveness to these protean expressions of comfort and support. An emotional, even histrionic
person might respond best to soothing words and a gentle tone, while a more obsessive, abstractly
logical patient (especially one with a technical background) might do best with a biologically detailed
explanation (whether or not scientifically validated), buttressed by laboratory data. People with strong
religious backgrounds or faith might take more comfort from faith-based narratives of illness and
reason for hope.
206. This distinction is perhaps too sharply drawn. To the extent that clinical expressions of
support and comfort increase compliance with effective treatment or potentiate a prescribed treatment's
efficacy (through a placebo effect), they contribute to rescue and health promotion and restoration.
207. See RUTH R. FADEN & ToM L. BEAUCHAMP, A HISTORY AND THEORY OF INFORMED
CONSENT 151-86 (1986); see also text accompanying notes 73-74.
208. See Lawrence 0. Gostin, Health Information Privacy, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 451 (1995).
209. See LAWRENCE 0. GoSTIN, PUBLIC HEALTH LAW: POWER, DUTY, RESTRAINT 113-42 (2000)
(discussing tensions in law between medical privacy concerns and community-wide health promotion).
210. See Edmund D. Pellegrino, Societal Duty and Moral Complicity: The Physician's Dilemma
of Divided Loyalty, 16 INT'L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 371 (1993).
211. See, e.g., TALCOTT PARSONS, THE SOCIAL SYSTEM 428-47 (1951); Bloche, Clinical Loyalties
and the Social Purposes of Medicine, supra note 129.
212. See Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211 (2000).
213. See Shea v. Esensten, 107 F.3d 625 (8th Cir. 1997).
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Financial incentives for withholding care,214 release of personal health in-
formation to insurers, employers, governments, and even direct mail mar-
keters,215 and administrative constraints on access to covered services are
among the policies that have been defended by reference to disclosure and
consent. Greater regard for -personal dignity as a health law aim would
raise the bar to such promiscuous use of consent, especially when given in
a pro forma rather than a reflective, deliberative manner. Greater legal em-
phasis on the dignity of the sick should also imply heightened protection
for the Hippocratic precept of undivided professional loyalty to patients
and lower tolerance for financial and organizational arrangements that
align clinical caretakers with health care payers.1 6
A system of health care provision that fared well in terms of the four
aims just discussed-health promotion and restoration, rescue, support and
comfort, and personal dignity-would nevertheless be a moral failure, in-
deed a national embarrassment, were some among us unable to access it.
Whether such access should be considered an individual right 217 or a social
obligation21 is a question beyond my scope here. But the American failure
to achieve universal access to medical care is at odds with the standard set
by the rest of the industrialized world.219 This standard expresses a global
consensus around the notion of health care as a need so basic that belong-
ing to a society that entitles a person to its provision. 2 ' By failing to pro-
vide some among us with care that meets our society's conception of what
constitutes a decent minimum, 22' we send them and others a troubling
214. E.g., Tracy E. Miller & William M. Sage, Disclosing Physician Financial Incentives, 281
JAMA 1424 (1999); E. Haavi Morreim, To Tell the Truth: Disclosing the Incentives and Limits of
Managed Care, 3 AM. J. MANAGED CARE 35 (1997). Disclosure and consent to such incentives can
occur via contract, when consumers subscribe to health plans, or later on, in doctors' offices, when
patients choose primary care or other providers. The proliferation of different methods of physician
payment within single health plans has led some proponents of this extension of the consent paradigm
to prefer the doctor's office as the locus for this type of disclosure and consent.
215. See M. Gregg Bloche, Managed Care, Medical Privacy, and the Paradigm of Consent, 7
KENNEDY INST. ETHICS J. 381 (1997).
216. See Bloche, Trust and Betrayal in the Medical Marketplace, supra note 129.
217. See John D. Arras, Retreat from the Right to Health Care: The President s Commission and
Access to Health Care, 6 CARDOZO L. REV. 321 (1984); see also T. Patrick Hill, Health Care: A Social
Contract in Transition, 43 Soc. ScI. & MED. 783 (1996).
218. THE PEPPER COMMISSION: U.S. BIPARTISAN COMM'N ON COMPREHENSIVE HEALTH CARE,
JOIST CONG., A CALL FOR ACTION (2d Sess. 1990).
219. Proponents of universal access used to note acidly that the United States and South Africa
were the only industrialized nations that did not provide it. But postapartheid South Africa instituted a
program of universal access, leaving the United States with no peer in this regard.
220. See MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF PLURALIST EQUALITY 68
(1983) (arguing that every society somehow defines its own set of basic human needs, then ensures
their provision to all whom it recognizes as members).
221. Although there is much room for debate over what level of assured access to care constitutes
a decent minimum, American law's guarantee of emergency services only to our country's forty-two
million uninsured, the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd
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message of social exclusion 212 and nonrecognition of our common human-
ity. If one postulates that this is morally unacceptable in the twenty-first
century, then a fifth aim of the law of health care provision should be to
universalize access to basic medical services. To be sure, courts and regu-
latory agencies have little leeway here: Congress and state legislatures de-
termine the scope of public provision of medical coverage and services to
those unable to afford them. But where courts or agencies can make a dif-
ference, for example, by construing ambiguous statutory provisions, recog-
nition of this fifth aim favors interpretations that expand access to services.
IV
PRELIMINARY APPLICATIONS
How might this account of medicine's conflicting purposes and health
law's aims contribute to resolution of legal disputes in the health sphere?
Here, I suggest some parameters for an ordered approach. My intent is not
to persuade readers that my approach is "right." The importance of democ-
ratic deliberation for the further formulation of health law's aims-and for
choices between aims when they conflict-renders it impossible, in the
abstract, to specify a "right" approach. My more modest objective here is
to offer a starting point for reflective legal and regulatory choice that takes
richer, more open account of our expectations of medicine than can the
language of systemic efficiency. But I make a less modest claim. By spot-
lighting the substantive disagreements that efficiency talk suppresses, legal
decision makers can resolve them more consistently and predictably. The
law can thereby send clearer, more coherent behavioral signals to health
care actors, fostering their ability to innovate in socially useful ways. And,
by rendering controversial substantive choices more visible, the law can
promote popular engagement, through politics, in the making of these
choices.
I begin with American health law's embarrassing moral back-
drop: our national failure to make basic medical care available to all. Uni-
versal access to care is morally urgent, not primarily on promotion-of-
health grounds (since other social programs can promote population-wide
health more cheaply), but as expression of our common humanity and
community. Until we make basic health services accessible to all, debate
about how the law should treat the concerns of those financially able to
obtain care leaves a disturbing moral aftertaste. Thus the imperative of
expanding access favors legal interpretations that tend toward this end,
(2000) [hereinafter EMTALA], surely falls short. It does not compare to the comprehensive packages
of basic services available to all in every other industrialized nation.
222. The message of social exclusion is sometimes explicit, as it was in the 1996 federal
legislation that authorized states and localities to bar noncitizens from publicly funded health services.
See Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act of 1996, 8 U.S.C. § 1611-1614 (2000).
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even at the expense of such concerns as the progressivity of public financ-
ing, 223 preservation of the tort system's panoply of rights and remedies,
224
and maintenance of a broad range of choice between health care providers.
Beyond this, courts and agencies ought to treat the law of health care
provision not as a tool for maximizing the aggregate medical benefits that
clinical dollars buy, but as an expression of the awkward coexistence of
health promotion and less-tangible aims-those I have tried to capture
through the categories of rescue, support and comfort, and regard for the
dignity of the vulnerable. We cannot hope to calibrate precisely the import
of each of these aims in all of the circumstances that spawn legal conflict.
The law should therefore avoid grand, systemic efforts to determine what is
most rational or efficient. Whether the imperatives of rescue, comfort, or
regard for dignity should prevail over population-wide health promotion
and restoration should be decided case-by-case, even as the law grounds its
choices on precedent and aspires to consistency. Reactions of the heart,225
social norms, 226 and public values all have roles in this decision making, as
does analysis of financial costs and health benefits. How might this strat-
egy apply to the fields of law I considered earlier as illustrations of welfare
maximization's failings? Review of the many questions that concern health
law decision makers is beyond this Article's scope, but I propose some
analytic starting points.
A. Medical Tort Law
The setting of standards of care in medical-malpractice cases should
reflect the priority of rescue over population-wide efficiency, especially
when treatment that a plaintiff says should have been provided would have
stood a serious chance of making a life-saving or life-changing difference.
We honor the ethic of rescue, and our feelings of solidarity with people in
223. EMTALA, supra note 221, and other federal and state laws require hospitals to provide
"free" emergency and other services that are in fact cross-subsidized from health-insurance premiums
paid by consumers and their employers, then transferred to hospitals as compensation for services. Such
financing is regressive, like a sales tax, in that it takes generally higher percentages of household
income from less-well-off consumers (so long as they are insured). Robert A. Carolina & M. Gregg
Bloche, Paying for Undercompensated Hospital Care: The Regressive Profile of a "Hidden Tax", 2
HEALTH MATRIX 141 (1992). Thus, expansive constructions of EMTALA and other "free" care
requirements both enlarge access and selectively burden the least prosperous insureds.
224. Were it to be proven, for example, that caps on punitive damages or awards for pain and
suffering translate into lower health coverage costs and expanded access to care, such limits would
merit serious consideration.
225. Cf NUSSBAUM, supra note 85, at 40-43 (considering the reflective, deliberative use of our
impassioned reactions as instruments of ethical and moral reasoning).
226. To a degree insufficiently acknowledged, except among the small number of economics-
oriented scholars who have begun to study the welfare-enhancing functions of specialized social norms,
social and professional mores can be understood in neoclassical economics terms. See ROBERT C.
ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: How NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES 123-239 (1991). Health-
economics scholarship and research, so often critical of the mores of physicians and other clinical
actors, have been slow to explore such possibilities.
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anguish, by requiring that the best of generally available medical technol-
ogy227 be employed on behalf of the sick, especially the very sick, unless
we have good scientific reasons to believe that the intervention at issue is
futile or of minimal benefit. Proposals to require the converse-to make
scientific proof of a technique's efficacy a prerequisite for treating it as a
legal standard of care-founder on the awkward fact that most diagnostic
and therapeutic interventions are ill supported by scientific evidence.225
Taken literally, this prerequisite would bar the adoption of most clinical
techniques as legal standards of care. So long as patients retain some con-
fidence in medical judgment absent scientific data,229 refusal by the legal
system to hold straying practitioners to professional standards might be
understood by patients as license for professional abandonment.
One might object that this rescue-oriented approach indulges social
waste, and that tort law should not "lock in" clinical practices that are the
product of insurance-induced market distortion. My answer is that priority
for the ethic of rescue over population-wide efficiency in health promotion
is not wasteful if it accurately reflects our values. Moreover, as I presently
suggest, the law governing medical insurance can, in conjunction with in-
novative insurance-coverage design, nudge clinical practice away from
ever-more-costly interventions of low or uncertain biological value without
unduly compromising the ethic of rescue.
The imperatives of rescue and respect for the dignity of people made
vulnerable by medical misfortune weigh against retreat from the require-
ment of full disclosure of therapeutic options to sick patients. Proponents
of such a retreat argue that sick patients' clinical self-determination de-
serves less scope because insurance desensitizes patients to cost.230 Such a
retreat might permit a health plan's physicians to refrain from disclosing
227. Large variations in clinical practice, both between and within localities, make the setting of
legal standards of care problematic even after one accepts this approach, due to the paucity of scientific
evidence establishing the best treatment alternatives. This indeterminacy can be narrowed to some
degree by giving priority to local clinical standards. From a rescue-oriented perspective, which calls for
use of all available medical means, failure to provide a therapy that is rarely or never offered to patients
in a given locality (and thus is not part of local expectations) seems less troublesome than failure to
provide a treatment that is often employed locally.
228. This is not to say that most interventions have been scientifically shown to be ineffective. It
says only that we lack good scientific answers, either pro or con, to the question of their efficacy. See
supra text accompanying notes 54-72.
229. The prevailing view, sometimes tacit and other times explicit, in the medical outcomes
research and health economics literature is that clinical judgment without scientific proof is at best of
little informational value and at worst laden with distortions and misperceptions arising from cognitive
errors and each physician's small lifetime clinical sample size. An alternative view holds that clinical
judgment absent scientific proof has at least modest validity of its own. See FED. JUD. CENTER,
REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE (2d ed. 2000) (reviewing admissibility of medical
testimony under the Federal Rules of Evidence); cf DONALD A. SCHON, THE REFLECTIVE
PRACTITIONER: How PROFESSIONALS THINK IN ACTION (1983) (analyzing clinical problem solving).
230. See, e.g., Clark C. Havighurst, Prospective Self-Denial: Can Consumers Contract Today to
Accept Health Care Rationing Tomorrow?, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1755, 1758-59 (1992).
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more costly clinical alternatives that the plan would prefer not to cover.23 1
Were systemwide efficiency in health promotion and restoration the law's
primary aim, this retreat might be justified, though it would present risks of
exploitation by plans and providers.2 32 The imperatives of rescue and re-
gard for personal dignity, however, lend countervailing force to preserva-
tion of sick patients' autonomy. The detailed contours of informed-consent
doctrine in the era of managed care are beyond my scope here. But the
overarching approach I urge is that informed-consent law continue to re-
flect the viewpoint of individual patients in need, and sometimes in an-
guish, and that it refrain from population-wide thinking about health
promotion and the sparing of resources. 33
Medical tort law should further safeguard patients from the indignity
of betrayal by moving from inchoate suggestion 234 to adoption of the prin-
ciple that physicians have a duty of undivided loyalty to their patients.235
The law has been peculiarly slow to impose on clinical caretakers the same
fiduciary obligations it insists upon for lawyers, financial advisors, and
other professionals. 236 It has relied instead upon the paradigm of informed
consent to protect patients against exploitation by the doctor with a double
agenda. 237 But the rise of vertically and horizontally integrated health plans
and other contractual arrangements that put physicians at risk for the costs
of care238 is putting unprecedented financial and other pressure on doctors
to depart from the ethic of undivided loyalty to patients. 239 To be sure,
some argue that financial incentives to withhold services are a cheaper,
easier-to-administer cost-control method than is arms length, prospective
231. It might do so either by simply cutting back on the informed-consent doctrine's disclosure
obligations or by allowing health plans and subscribers to contract out of current bedside-disclosure
requirements.
232. If providers failed to disclose "efficient" clinical alternatives, patients would typically not
learn about them, enabling health plans to reduce their costs and increase their profits in a socially
wasteful manner.
233. I do not mean to suggest here that population-wide reasoning has no place in health law (it
should, as I argue below), but only that the law's protection for patient self-determination at the
moment of medical decision should not be rolled back out of regard for population-wide concerns.
234. See Wickline v. State, 239 Cal. Rptr. 810 (Ct. App. 1986) (asserting in dictum that treating
physicians should be advocates for their patients vis-a-vis health plans).
235. Bloche, Clinical Loyalties and the Social Purposes of Medicine, supra note 129.
236. MARC A. RODWIN, MEDICINE, MONEY, AND MORALS: PHYSICIANS' CONFLICTS OF INTEREST
(1993).
237. In this, the law has taken its cue from the bioethics movement, which for the last thirty years
or more has given primacy to informed consent as an instrument for protecting patients and has
relegated the problem of multiple loyalties to the philosophic background. M. Gregg Bloche, Beyond
Consent, in RESEARCH ON HUMAN SUBJECTS: ETHICS, LAW, AND SOCIAL POLICY 44 (David N.
Weisstub ed., 1998).
238. Thomas Rice, Physician Payment Policies: Impacts and Implications, 18 ANN. REV. PUB.
HEALTH 549 (1997).
239. Daniel Sulmasy et al., Physicians' Ethical Beliefs About Cost-Control Arrangements, 160
ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 649 (2000).
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utilization review. 240 But to the extent that physician fidelity to patients
fosters their sense of dignity (by shielding them from the experience of
betrayal) and reassures them that, in time of need, their caretakers will at-
tempt rescue, incentives to withhold services impose intangible emotional
and moral costs. Proponents of financial rewards for frugal practice rarely
acknowledge these costs.
One might argue in response that advance disclosure of such incen-
tives to patients 24 1 should suffice. 2 4 2 Patients sufficiently concerned about
these incentives will avoid health plans that offer them and providers who
accept them, this argument holds; thus we can look to the medical market-
place to resolve the question of their social desirability. This argument
privileges the health care choices that consumers or their employers make
before the onset of illness. The argument neglects the vulnerability and
dependence they experience when medical crisis or need arises. To the ex-
tent that consumers, when choosing among plans and providers, fail to fo-
cus on provider payment arrangements or to anticipate their feelings of
vulnerability and dependence when illness strikes, this privileging of the ex
ante (pre-illness) perspective is at odds with human experience. Empirical
research into consumers' thinking about doctors' financial incentives might
better illuminate their ex ante understandings. But it is doubtful that the
typical health-plan subscriber, after at most a few hours spent reading plan
descriptions and interviewing doctors, focuses meaningfully on these in-
centives or anticipates the fear and dependence that come with the threat of
serious illness. I thus submit that advance disclosure is an inadequate re-
sponse to financial or other incentives to doctors to limit treatment. It is
inadequate, that is, if the law of health care provision is to be rooted in hu-
man experience, hopes, and expectations, as I have urged here.
A detailed account of how the law might formulate a duty of loyalty
that responds to these concerns is beyond my scope here, but I suggest
some general principles. First, this duty should apply both to physicians
who accept incentives that create conflicts of interest and to health plans or
other actors that offer these incentives.243 Second, the duty should
240. See generally MARK V. PAULY ET AL., PAYING PHYSICIANS: OPTIONS FOR CONTROLLING
COST, VOLUME, AND INTENSITY OF SERVICES (1992); Jerome R. Gardner & Roxy Maroney,
Positioning for Capitation by Redesigning Internal Processes, HEALTHCARE FIN. MGMT., July 1995, at
40,42.
241. Such disclosure could occur when patients choose employment, subscribe to health plans, or
enter into doctor-patient relationships with particular providers. See Wolf, supra note 77.
242. Deven C. McGraw, Financial Incentives to Limit Services: Should Physicians Be Required
to Disclose These to Patients?, 83 GEO. L.J. 1821 (1995) (arguing that physician disclosure should
satisfy doctrine of informed consent); see also Shea v. Esensten, 107 F.3d 625 (8th Cir. 1997) (holding
that health-insurance providers for employer-sponsored health plans have a fiduciary duty, under
ERISA, to disclose physicians' financial incentives to withhold services).
243. The U.S. Supreme Court's decision two years ago, in Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211
(2000), was dismaying for its failure to read ERISA's fiduciary duty language to limit HMOs'
economic rewards to physicians for withholding care, see supra note 14, and for its refusal to
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encompass arrangements that reward clinicians for ordering more services
or for making referrals. 2" Third, financial and other influences on clinical
decision making are unavoidable, and the duty should be formulated realis-
tically. The goal is to avoid incentives that too strongly tempt physicians to
break faith with their patients. Drawing lines and setting limits is a com-
plex endeavor, more appropriately undertaken by a specialized regulatory
agency than by the courts. Among the complexities that beset such limit-
setting are lack of empirical evidence regarding the links between clinical
judgment and levels of physician risk for the cost of care and the difficulty
of determining individual doctors' incentives.24 But if legislators and regu-
lators fail to act on this front, courts should not shy from intervening, as
best they can, with the aid of expert witnesses and other oft-used judicial
tools for coping with technical complexity.
Some urge a more restrictive approach to physicians' financial incen-
tives, proposing that doctors be paid pre-set salaries.246 This would put
health plans and physicians into employment relationships, limiting the
flexibility of both to respond to patients' and health care purchasers'
changing needs. Employment relations create powerful influences on phy-
sician judgment, arising from lines of supervisory authority and from the
development of corporate cultures responsive to employers' needs. These
influences may put more pressure on medical judgment than do strong fi-
nancial incentives. Neither the law nor governing ethical principles require
that other professionals with analogous fiduciary responsibilities be com-
pensated without regard for the volume of services rendered. Lawyers'
hourly billing and investment professionals' transaction-based compensa-
tion are typically treated as consistent with their fiduciary obligations.
Payment of physicians in rough proportion to the time they put in on their
patients' behalf should be similarly accepted. Financial rewards for adher-
ence to widely accepted patterns of best, frugal practice, such as strategic
sequencing of diagnostic work-ups to gather a given level of information at
minimum costs, should also be accepted.247 But financial rewards for
referrals to specialists, clinical laboratories, hospitals, and so on are
acknowledge divided loyalty at the bedside as a concern in itself, apart from its influence upon levels of
care. On the other hand, Pegram left the door open to state law challenges to monetary rewards for
withholding treatment.
244. See M. Gregg Bloche, Editorial, Cutting Waste and Keeping Faith, 128 ANNALS INTERNAL
MED. 688 (1998).
245. Most physicians participate in multiple health plans, each with different payment schemes,
and many doctors are part of group practices. These practices receive revenues from numerous health
plans and then distribute this money to doctors based on these practices' own internal incentive
schemes.
246. Arnold S. Relman, Salaried Physicians and Economic Incentives, 319 NEW ENG. J. MED.
784 (1988).
247. Sensible reward systems along such lines could be developed and updated in consultation
with panels of leading physicians possessing state-of-the-art knowledge of relevant research data and
areas of clinical consensus.
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problematic, as are large premiums for time spent performing invasive pro-
cedures as opposed to evaluating and talking with patients or developing
diagnostic or therapeutic plans.248
The clinician's fiduciary duty should also oblige physicians to appeal
health care payers' refusals to authorize services if the physician believes
such refusals are unfounded.249 In practice, liability arising from breach of
fiduciary obligations would be unusual, since causal links between such
breach and legally cognizable damages would be difficult to establish.
Yet the prospect of this liability would affirm, at least symbolically, the
physician's duty and commitment to stand by patients in need.
B. Disputes Over Medical Coverage
So long as health plans employ the vacuous term "medical necessity"
to define their contractual coverage obligations, legal decision makers must
look to external sources to impute content to these obligations. In so doing,
they should sustain the priority of rescue over population-wide efficiency
by requiring, as I have urged for the setting of tort standards, that the best
of generally available medical technology be covered, absent good scien-
tific reason for believing it to be futile or only minimally beneficial. To
require less by way of coverage would be to permit plans to breach the
promise of attempted rescue that a commitment to meet medical need im-
plies. Rescuers do not act half heartedly; they make their best efforts using
the best available means, which is what the socially constructed concept of
need calls for when a person is in difficult straits.21 Rescue makes this
248. Physicians in many specialties can earn upwards of ten times more per hour performing
technology-intensive procedures than by engaging in such "cognitive" activities as interviewing
patients and planning diagnostic work-ups. See, e.g., James V. Maloney, Jr., A Critical Analysis of the
Resource-Based Relative Value Scale, 266 JAMA 3453 (1991). The result is a set of perverse and
pervasive incentives to invade the body in a costly fashion, with little planning or reflection.
249. To avoid obliging the clinician to function, without pay or expertise, in a lawyer-like mode,
this duty to appeal should perhaps be limited to use of the health plan's internal, administrative appeals
process, though the clinician should also cooperate with legal counsel retained by the patient if the
clinician's internal appeals fail. See Bloche, supra note 70. But f William M. Sage, Physicians as
Advocates, 35 Hous. L. REV. 1529 (1999) (arguing against lawyer-like advocacy duties for physicians
vis-a-vis health plans).
250. A plaintiff would need to prove that absent the breach of fiduciary duty, she would have
received care that would probably have prevented the harm alleged. She would thus have to show not
only that an alternative, superior course of treatment would have avoided the harm, but that had the
defendant abided by its fiduciary duty, she would have received the better treatment.
251. It is said, for example, that the climber stranded on a mountain precipice "needs" a helicopter
rescue-even if her own recklessness created her predicament and even if the resources spent on such a
rescue could save more lives if otherwise employed-so long as a helicopter is present and can reach
the precipice without grave risk to its crew. Readers, I am sure, can come up with many similar
examples of this cognitive construct and moral intuition, an intuition I treat in this Article as worthy of
respect rather than a thing to be dismissed as error.
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moral demand, and rescuers who fall short in this regard are subject to
moral reproach. 2
Subscribing to a health plan, on the other hand, is an act of choice,
albeit experienced as more or less "voluntary" depending on the chooser's
financial circumstances, range of medical coverage options, and other life
parameters. Regard for the dignity of individuals requires that the law
honor subscribers' choices to accept less than the conventional promise of
medically necessary care, so long as agreed-upon moral prerequisites for
"voluntariness '' 2 3 are met. Thus the law should permit health plans to offer
prospective subscribers less than this promise and to hold patients to the
terms of the deal when unfortunate medical conditions arise. The impera-
tive of population-wide health promotion supports such deference to con-
tractual choice, since consumers' decisions to economize on costly medical
services may facilitate movement of resources to activities that promote
health more cheaply. But the imperatives of rescue, regard for dignity, and
universalization (or at least expansion) of access to medical services weigh
in favor. of a cautious approach to enforcement of contractual terms that
offer less than the conventional commitment to medically necessary care.
To bind themselves and their families to such terms, plan subscribers
should choose them clearly and deliberatively from among affordable con-
tractual options that include conventional medical-necessity language. It is
not enough for the proverbial "small print" in the plan description to
clearly explain coverage limits and exclusions. Employers and health plans
need to develop subscription procedures that ensure high-visibility disclo-
sure of coverage limits and careful consumer consideration of their poten-
tial clinical implications before signing up. Consumers should be aware,
for example, of the kinds of treatments, for instance organ transplants, that
a plan specifically excludes. In the case of contract language allowing
plans to refrain from covering scientifically unproven therapies, consumers
should be told that most medical interventions lack clear scientific proof of
efficacy and that such language therefore gives plans broad discretion to
deny coverage for accepted treatments. Contract terms authorizing plans to
weigh clinical benefits against costs should clearly state cost-benefit trade-
off principles and policies toward medical uncertainty. These general prin-
ciples should be made concrete for prospective subscribers (and future le-
gal decision makers) through particular examples of therapies covered and
foregone. This kind of clarity of disclosure and of subscriber understanding
should be a moral prerequisite for "voluntary" opting out from the
252. See Eric Mack, Bad Samaritanism and the Causation of Harm, 9 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 230
(1980).
253. Whether consciously or otherwise, we characterize choices as "voluntary" when we believe
that the circumstances and pressures under which they were made are sufficiently acceptable, morally,
to support holding the chooser responsible for the consequences. Bloche, supra note 76.
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conventional coverage of medically necessary care; moreover, for opting
out to be deemed "voluntary," conventional coverage should be affordable
(through public subsidies if necessary).2 4
C. Legal Safeguards for Medical Professionalism
If maximizing health promotion per clinical dollar spent were the sole
aim of American health care law, the Hippocratic ethic of undivided pro-
fessional loyalty to patients would often stand in the way of sensible re-
source management. But the imperatives of rescue, support and comfort,
and regard for the dignity of people in medical distress favor robust protec-
tion for the Hippocratic norm of clinical fidelity to the point that infringe-
ment on this ethic should be rare. Failure to buffer the medical profession
from contemporary market pressures could eviscerate this ethic, both as a
constraint on behavior and as a moral ideal,255 by putting physicians under
the authority of health-plan managers and others with cross-cutting goals.
Cognitive dissonance between this institutional reality and the Hippocratic
ideal could prove unsustainable, collapsing the fiduciary ideal as a cogni-
tive structure capable of restraining self-interest.256 Recognition in tort law
of a duty of loyalty along the lines described above would both reinforce
Hippocratic fidelity as a behavioral constraint and empower physicians to
resist contrary pressures from payers and others. Additional legal con-
straints aimed at bolstering professional loyalty to patients include prohibi-
tion of health plans' efforts to discourage physicians from telling patients
about accepted but costly therapies and limits on health plans' power to
choose providers based on their clinical spending patterns.
254. What is "voluntary" and what is otherwise is, of course, not clear cut: such line drawing
requires difficult moral and political judgments about the acceptability of the chooser's decision-
making circumstances and range of alternatives. M. Gregg Bloche, Beyond Autonomy: Coercion and
Morality in Clinical Relationships, 6 HEALTH MATRIX 229 (1996). But the questions of voluntariness
and affordability at least frame the inquiry and signal that ex ante, contractual consent to limits beyond
the "medical necessity" baseline should not be taken at face value, without examining the conditions
that give rise to consent. Cf David B. Goodwin, Disputing Insurance Coverage Disputes, 43 STAN. L.
REV. 779 (1991) (discussing strong propensity of courts to treat insureds as lacking bargaining power
and to apply "contract of adhesion" doctrine in coverage disputes).
255. Professional commitment to this ethic may already be eroding. A 1996 survey of more than
1500 practicing physicians found that 80% believed that the medical profession's commitment to the
ethic of undivided loyalty to patients had decreased during the previous ten years. Sulmasy et al., supra
note 239.
256. It is a rarely observed irony that some of the most vigorous proponents of managerial use of
financial incentives to reduce physicians' clinical spending look to the fiduciary ethic to keep
physicians from taking frugality too far, even as they discount the corrosive effect of such incentives on
the profession's fiduciary commitment. See Brief of Amicus Curiae American Association of Health
Plans at 18, Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211 (2000) (No. 98-1949) (asserting that financial incentives
will not "motivate physicians to cast aside their professional and ethical obligations"). See also G.
Khushf, A Radical Rupture in the Paradigm of Modern Medicine: Conflicts of Interest, Fiduciary
Obligations, and the Scientific Ideal, 23 J. MED. PHIL. 98 (1998).
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The case for deference to professional self-governance as a way to
promote the efficacy of clinical care has been much undermined over the
past few decades by mounting evidence of professional ignorance about the
effectiveness of medical interventions. Further study of the content of
medical expertise, the nature of medical self-governance, and what each
may contribute to quality of care when scientific evidence is lacking might
prove valuable. 257 Meanwhile, it may make sense, from a risk-averse per-
spective, for regulators and private accreditors to continue to defer to the
credentialing authority of professional organizations in the various special-
ties and to require that health plans and hospitals do the same.
Such deference, however, should not extend to professional organiza-
tions' efforts to use their cultural and moral authority as leverage for the
pursuit of economic advantages that serve no public purpose. Such efforts
include advocacy of exemptions from state financial-reserve requirements
for physician-sponsored health plans, attempts to set fees collectively, and
pursuit of regulatory "safe harbors" for referral of patients to laboratory
and other facilities in which the referring clinician has an interest. So-
called patient-protection bills, now being pushed in many state legislatures
by medical societies, contain some provisions that would strengthen the
fiduciary ethic and professional self-governance along the lines urged
above. But they contain others-for example, "any willing provider"
clauses 25-that would limit health plans' ability to choose providers based
on defensible quality 259 and price 261 concerns. Some of these provisions
would also bar health plans from contracting with subscribers for less than
the conventional promise of "medically necessary" care.
D. Health Care Antitrust Law
Robust policing of health care markets for price-fixing activity and for
combinations that create troublesome market power, as market power is
257. Among health care economists in particular, there is a strong tendency to doubt the value of
clinical judgments that are not well supported by scientific evidence. The impressions, training, and
past experiences that support such judgment are often dismissed as little more than accumulations of
heuristic bias and error. The validity of this sort of professional expertise should neither be reflexively
denied nor presumed, and it is a question of much import for the future of health care law and policy.
258. See Ky. Ass'n of Health Plans v. Nichols, 227 F.3d 352 (6th Cir. 2000), cert. granted, 122 S.
Ct. 2657 (2002) (holding state "any willing provider" statute, requiring health plans to accept all
qualified physicians, to be "saved" from ERISA preemption).
259. Defensible quality concerns might include educational credentials (beyond those minimally
necessary to enter professional practice), research and publication records, and evidence of adherence
to accepted patterns of best, frugal practice.
260. By limiting the size of their provider panels, health plans can channel their bulk purchasing
power to obtain lower prices for their subscribers. See generally JOHN R. GRIFFITH, THE WELL-
MANAGED HEALTH CARE ORGANIZATION 515-58 (3d ed. 1995).
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conventionally measured,261 should remain the centerpiece of medical anti-
trust enforcement. Congress and the enforcement agencies should reject
physicians' efforts to win antitrust exemption for collective bargaining
over fees. These unexceptional propositions further the imperatives of
population-wide health promotion and expanded access to medical services
by holding down costs to purchasers. Over the long haul, moreover, vigor-
ous price competition could slow increases in spending on high-
technology, low-benefit services by trimming the windfalls available to
providers of cutting-edge technologies. Reducing these windfalls would
moderate the cycle of ambitious technology-oriented research and devel-
opment, large financial rewards (from health care payers) for sellers and
practitioners of new technologies, and resulting high incentives for new
research and development.262 Robust price competition presents no obstacle
to the imperatives of rescue, support and comfort, and respect for the dig-
nity of the sick. And, by restraining low-benefit spending, it could shift
resources to public programs and economic development activities that
more effectively promote health.
On the other hand, efficiency grounds do not clearly support the anti-
trust-enforcement agencies' current preference for economic risk bearing
by providers, 263 and this policy fosters physician payment schemes that put
patients' trust at risk. Antitrust decision makers should therefore decline to
treat provider risk-bearing as a safe harbor for collective price setting.
However, collective action by physicians on nonprice matters that affect
professional trustworthiness and judgment should be evaluated under the
antitrust "rule of reason" and, in some cases, permitted. Such matters in-
clude so-called gag rules and other efforts to keep physicians from telling
patients about costly treatment options, implementation of clinical-practice
protocols, and the handling of appeals when insurers decline to authorize
care. The U.S. Supreme Court's opinion in California Dental Association
v. FTC" opened the way for this approach. Upholding the association's
disclosure requirements for discount advertising, the Court said, in essence,
that collective action by professionals in defense of ethical norms is allow-
able under the "rule of reason" when such action furthers consumer
261. Herfindal-Hirschman Index ("H HI") definition of relevant geographic and product markets
will remain especially complicated in the health care field due to overlapping and uncertain geographic
patterns of service use and the myriad services and bundles of services offered by providers.
262. My focus here is on investment in new, low-benefit technologies-those that Lewis Thomas
famously termed "half-way technologies," because they do not target basic biological mechanisms of
disease and consequently tend toward unimpressive biological results. LEwis THOMAS, THE LIVES OF A
CELL: NOTES OF A BIOLOGY WATCHER 33-36 (1974). As Thomas argued, we may be overinvesting in
"half-way technologies" and underinvesting in the basic biological research necessary to build
foundations for more decisive therapeutic advances.
263. See supra text accompanying notes 165-68.
264. 526 U.S. 756 (1999).
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welfare. 265 By construing consumer welfare to incorporate the purposes of
medicine I have discussed, including intangibles like trustworthiness, anti-
trust decision makers can and should give health care providers safe harbor
to act collectively on nonprice matters of concern to consumers. To be
sure, perfect agency by providers on their patients' behalf in such matters
is unattainable: to some degree, providers pursue self-interest. But the
norm of Hippocratic commitment to patients, which itself can be explained
in terms of the medical profession's long-term interest in its own credibil-
ity,2 66 is likely to channel providers' advocacy in such matters along lines
that parallel patients' concerns.2 67
E. Regulation of Capital Investment
Assessed in terms of the aims of health care law that I have identified,
regulatory constrains on capital investment are a bad idea. The indetermi-
nacies that plague regulators' attempts to specify optimal ratios of clinical
plant and equipment to people and to apply these ratios case-by-case to
proposed capital projects2 61 make the CON paradigm an unpromising tool
for the cost-effective promotion of health. The paralytic conflict that these
indeterminacies engender virtually ensures enormous waste, particularly
when competing applicants vie before agencies and courts for authorization
to initiate services. To the extent that constraints on capital investment suc-
ceed in holding the supply of clinical services below the demand, friction
within health care institutions over allocation of these services to patients
engenders additional waste. Moreover, the politics of personal influence
often substitutes for agreed upon means of determining patients' relative
needs.269
The supply-demand mismatches that are the goal of CON regulation
also operate at cross purposes with the imperative of rescue. The impera-
tive of rescue implies access to technology that is widely available and that
might make a difference for people in difficult medical straits. Assessed in
terms of the imperative of support and comfort, the case for the CON para-
digm is at best equivocal. Constraints on capital investment might nudge
physicians toward more humane, less technology-oriented engagement
with patients. But diminished access to diagnostic technology could reduce
physicians' ability to offer detailed, plausible, and thus comforting clinical
265. To be precise, the Court said that collective professional action passes muster under the "rule
of reason" if the action is "procompetitive." Id. at 779-80. But, as critics of California Dental have
pointed out, the Court used the term "procompetitive" loosely, as synonymous with promotion of social
welfare. See supra note 163.
266. See Arrow, supra note 54,
267. M. Gregg Bloche, The Market for Medical Ethics, 26 J. HEALTH POL'Y, POL. & L. 1099
(2001).
268. See supra text accompanying notes 171-72.
269. See supra text accompanying notes 173-75.
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explanations. The CON paradigm's implications for the dignity of the sick
are negative, at least to the extent that supply-demand mismatches expose
patients to the politics of personal influence. Finally, to the extent that this
politics disfavors the least advantaged among us,27° the supply-demand
mismatches that "successful" CON regulation induces undercut the impera-
tive of universal access and the ideal of social inclusion.
CONCLUSION
The law of health care provision is a chaotic, dysfunctional patch-
work. It is thus understandable that many commentators and some courts
now look to the logic of social-welfare maximization to harmonize health
law. But the welfare-maximization premise is not up to the task. Our cog-
nitive limitations and moral disagreements make its logic too blurry in
practice. We cannot ask economics-or health law-for clear answers to
scientific and moral questions about medical care's efficacy and value that
our society has not been able to resolve.
The alternative approach to health care law that I have urged here be-
gins by conceding our cognitive failings and moral differences. It acknowl-
edges that we want many contradictory things from medicine. The oft-
stated aim of promotion and restoration of health fails to capture this un-
tidy complexity. Rather than settling for the false simplicity of some reduc-
tionist formula, legal decision makers should wrestle with the often
poignant, incommensurable concerns that animate health law disputes.
These concerns lie beneath health law's euphemistic terms-its references
to reasonable care, medical need, consumer welfare, and the like. Judges
should bring these concerns into the open. Transparency is vital if courts
are to align their health-policy judgments over time, across different doc-
trinal settings. And candid discussion of the values at stake might more
deeply engage citizens in debates about what health policy should be.
Rather than usurping the role of legislators in health policy, courts could
revitalize it, by drawing attention to hard questions now submerged in legal
euphemism.
I have proposed some normative starting points for the courts in sev-
eral doctrinal areas critical to the governance of managed care. But my lar-
ger aim is to change the way that courts "do" health law. Courts should pay
less heed to formal, doctrinal consistency and closer attention to the coher-
ence of the messages they send to actors in the health sphere. Courts should
resist the allure of a single yardstick of cost and benefit. And when judges
choose, as they must, between competing priorities, they should make the
normative basis for their choices explicit. By so doing, courts can increase
the likelihood that their decisions, over time, will produce wise health
270. See supra text accompanying notes 174-75.
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policy, responsive to the revolutionary changes American medicine is
undergoing.
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